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Abstract  The desirability of mandatory disclosure requirements in securities regulation 
has been the subject of a longstanding debate among corporate law scholars and 
economists.  The debate has largely focused on the desirability of mandatory disclosure 
requirements in the United States, a country characterized by dispersed ownership 
structures.  This article argues that there are strong theoretical reasons to believe that 
mandatory disclosure requirements can play a socially useful role in countries with 
concentrated ownership structures.  Controlling shareholders will tend to prefer poor firm 
transparency, to protect their private benefits of control, even if the presence of a 
demanding disclosure regime would have the socially desirable effect of increasing 
competition in the capital and product markets and reducing the agency costs associated 
with concentrated ownership structures. Recent empirical work is consistent with 
mandatory disclosure requirements fulfilling the valuable role of enhancing competition 
and reducing agency costs. 
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THE CASE FOR MANDATORY DISCLOSURE IN SECURITIES REGULATION AROUND THE WORLD 
                                             
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
  The desirability of mandatory disclosure requirements in securities regulation has 
been the subject of a longstanding debate among legal academics and economists.  A 
number of prominent commentators have argued that mandatory disclosure requirements 
are unnecessary, and even harmful, as market forces will generally ensure that firms 
disclose the optimal level of information.
1  Roberta Romano, for instance, has argued in a 
series of important articles for the removal of mandatory disclosure requirements.
2 
Proponents of mandatory disclosure have countered by arguing that there are important 
informational externalities generated by the information released by firms.
3 One such 
informational externality that has received significant attention is the possibility that firm 
disclosures may improve the stock price accuracy of firms other than the disclosing firm.
4  
Given that firms will not take into consideration these externalities in deciding which 
pieces of information to disclose, it is argued that a mandatory disclosure regime can be 
socially beneficial. 
                                                 
1 For scholars critical of mandatory disclosure, see Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market 
Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 Yale L. J. 2359 (1998); George Benston, Required Disclosure and 
the Stock Market: An Evaluation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 63 American Economic Review 
132 (1973); George Stigler, Public Regulation of the Securities Markets, 37 Journal of Business 117 
(1964); Homer Kripke, THE SEC AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE: REGULATION IN SEARCH OF A PURPOSE 
(Law & Business, 1979); cf. Jonathan Macey, Administrative Agency Obsolescence and Interest Group 
Formation: A Case Study of the SEC at Sixty, 60 Cardozo L. Rev. 909 (1994); Stephen J. Choi and Andrew 
Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the International Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. Cal. 
L.Rev. 903 (1998). 
2 See Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 Yale L. 
J. 2359 (1998) (proposing that firms select which states’ regulatory regime will set their disclosure 
requirements); Roberta Romano, The Need for Competition in International Securities Regulation, 2 
Theoretical Inquires 387 (2001) (defending the proposal against various criticisms). 
3 See Merritt Fox, Retaining Mandatory Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice is not Investor Empowerment, 85 
Va. L.Rev. 1335, 1345-46 (1999) (arguing that certain firm disclosures will have effects on third parties, 
such as supplier and customers, that will not be internalized by the firm); Merritt Fox, Securities Disclosure 
in a Globalizing Market: Who Should Regulate Whom, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 2498, 2562-69 (1997); cf. Marcel 
Kahan, Securities Laws and the Costs of “Inaccurate” Stock Prices, 41 Duke L.J. 977, 1034-35 (1992). 
4 See Merritt Fox, Securities Disclosure in a Globalizing Market: Who Should Regulate Whom, 95 Mich. 
L. Rev. 2498, 2562-69 (1997); Merritt Fox, Randall Morck, Bernard Yeung and Artyom Durnev, Law, 
Share Price Accuracy and Economic Performance: The New Evidence, forthcoming Michigan Law 
Review.  For a useful model capturing the effects of informational externalities associated with firm 
disclosures see Admati, Anat and Paul Pfleiderer, Forcing Firms to Talk: Financial Disclosure Regulation 
and Externalities, 13 Review of Financial Studies 479 (2000).   5
  Much of the debate to date has focused primarily on the merits of mandatory 
disclosure in the United States, which is unusual in having dispersed ownership 
structures.  This Article, in contrast, focuses on whether mandatory disclosure can play a 
socially beneficial role in countries with concentrated ownership structures.  Most 
countries around the world, including those of Continental Europe, have concentrated 
ownership structures. The case for mandatory disclosure in these countries, this Article 
will argue, does not hinge on whether there are informational externalities associated 
with firm disclosures, an issue that has dominated the academic debate over mandatory 
disclosure. Rather, the theoretical case, backed by substantial empirical support, for a 
demanding mandatory disclosure regime in these countries is based on the view that a 
demanding mandatory disclosure regime can reduce the level of diversion of corporate 
resources by controlling shareholders and promote competition (both for capital and in 
the product market) against established firms.  Neither a reduction in the diversion of 
corporate resources nor an increase in competition is likely to be in the interests of 
existing controlling shareholders. 
  Whether mandatory disclosure requirements are desirable is a crucial issue given 
the important role these requirements play in modern securities regulation.  A number of 
countries in the last decade have adopted and strengthened mandatory disclosure 
requirements for their publicly-traded firms.
5  Moreover, a number of countries, including 
developing countries, are considering adopting or strengthening their mandatory 
disclosure requirements.
6 Indeed, the quality of disclosure regulation has been a 
particular focus in the aftermath of the East Asian crisis of 1997-1998 which many have 
blamed, at least in part, on poor firm transparency in the region.
7    
                                                 
5 See Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law in CONVERGENCE 
AND PERSISTENCE IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE  52-53 (2004). 
6 See, e.g., Asian Development Bank, CORPORATE  GOVERNANCE AND FINANCE IN EAST  ASIA (2000); 
European Commission, Towards an EU-Regime on Transparency Obligations of Issuers whose Securities 
are Admitted to Trading on a Regulated Market, Consultation Document of the Services of the Internal 
Market Directorate General (11.7.2001) (proposing EU-wide disclosure requirements). 
7 See, e.g., Peter Boone, Alasdair Breach, Eric Friedman, and Simon Johnson, Corporate Governance in the 
Asian Crisis, 58 Journal of Financial Economics 141-186 (emphasizing overall poor corporate governance 
as responsible for East Asian crisis) (2000); Todd Mitton, A Cross-Firm Analysis of the Impact of 
Corporate Governance on the East Asian Crisis, 64 Journal of Financial Economics 215 (2002); Joseph 
Stiglitz, The Role of International Financial Institutions in the Current Global Economy, Address to the 
Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, February 27 (1998).   6
  The theoretical case for mandatory disclosure is based, in part, on the view that 
the level of diversion of corporate resources by controlling shareholders is, on average, 
substantial in countries with concentrated ownership structures and that these private 
benefits of control can be adversely affected by the adoption of a mandatory disclosure 
regime.  The empirical literature that documents the size of controlling shareholders' 
private benefits of control is discussed in Part III.A.  The prediction that controlling 
shareholders' private benefits of control can be reduced by a country's adoption of a 
mandatory disclosure regime is discussed in Part III.B.  If this prediction is true, then 
existing controlling shareholders will tend to have a preference for a lax disclosure 
regime.  The empirical literature that is relevant for whether there is, in fact, a linkage 
between disclosure regulation and the level of private benefits of control is also discussed 
in detail in Part III.B.  This literature, it is argued, is supportive of the view that 
mandatory disclosure reduces, sometimes substantially, controlling shareholders' private 
benefits of control. 
  Neither the fact that there are substantial private benefits of control nor that these 
benefits can be reduced through the adoption of a mandatory disclosure regime are 
sufficient, however, to establish the desirability of mandatory disclosure in countries with 
concentrated ownership structures.  It is possible, for example, that private benefits of 
control merely represent a transfer of value from minority shareholders to controlling 
shareholders with no net social losses. The effect of mandatory disclosure on 
competition, both for capital and in the product market, must be considered in evaluating 
whether social losses are likely to result from existing controlling shareholders' tendency 
to prefer a lax disclosure regime.  Part III.C.1 argues that a mandatory disclosure regime 
can reduce the cost of external finance to potential competitors of firms owned by 
existing controlling shareholders.  Three mechanisms through which the costs of external 
finance for these firms can be reduced are discussed. A mandatory disclosure regime can 
reduce the adverse selection costs of raising external finance; lower the expected level of 
future private-information trading in the firm's stock; and enhance the ability of a firm 
raising external finance to credibly commit to a low level of diversion of corporate assets.  
Part III.C.2 then argues that it can often be the case that existing controlling shareholders,   7
including firms raising external finance for the first time, will prefer a lax disclosure 
regime as a means of reducing the ability of potential competitors to raise external 
finance. A socially undesirable reduction of competition can occur along two dimensions: 
a reduction in competition for capital and a reduction in competition in the product 
market.  The empirical evidence is consistent, it is argued, with the level of competition 
along both these dimensions being positively affected by the presence of a mandatory 
disclosure regime.
8 
  The fact that some controlling shareholders, perhaps even a significant percentage 
of them, would prefer a lax disclosure regime as a means to protect their private benefits 
of control and reduce competition does not necessarily imply that firms that do find it in 
their self-interest to credibly commit to a demanding disclosure regime cannot do so.  
Accordingly, Part IV argues that willing firms will not necessarily be able to credibly 
commit.  More specifically, government and exchanges might very well not adopt a 
demanding disclosure regime, even if there is firm demand for one, given the opposition 
of those firms that do not find it in their self-interest.  Moreover, as Part IV.B.1 
emphasizes, competition between a country's domestic exchanges for investors' order 
flow will not necessarily result in a "race to the top" in terms of disclosure requirements 
imposed by exchanges on listed firms.  Part IV.B.2 then looks at the pre-mandatory 
disclosure regulation of exchanges in the United States as a test case to see whether 
competition between exchanges will result in a demanding disclosure regime being 
offered by at least some exchanges.  This section argues that prior to governmental 
pressure on exchanges to adopt demanding disclosure regulation, the level of disclosure 
imposed on firms by U.S. exchanges, including the New York Stock Exchange, was quite 
low.  Furthermore, an examination of the annual reports filed by firms during this period 
supports this conclusion. Nor is international competition between exchanges for listings, 
as Part IV.C discusses, a perfect substitute for a country's home exchange or government 
adopting meaningful disclosure regulation. Finally, Part IV.D explains why firms, 
through provisions in their corporate charter and other contractual arrangements, are 
                                                 
8 For a general argument that investor protections can encourage product market competition see Raghuram 
Rajan and Luigi Zingales, SAVING CAPITALISM FROM THE CAPITALISTS (2003).   8
often unlikely to be able to credibly commit to a demanding disclosure regime through 
unilateral action. 
  A common argument for mandatory disclosure is the contention that mandatory 
disclosure ensures that the cheapest cost producer of firm-specific information, i.e. the 
firm in many circumstances, actually produces and discloses this information to the 
markets.  This has the socially beneficial effect, the argument goes, of avoiding having 
traders generate the same information but at higher cost.  Part V argues that this standard 
argument does not, standing alone, constitute a reason to favor mandatory disclosure. 
Rather, the force of this argument ultimately depends on whether firms are willing and 
able to credibly commit to a demanding disclosure regime -- the issues addressed in Parts 
III and IV. 
  Finally, empirical studies of the effect of mandatory disclosure on stock returns, 
volatility and financial development are examined in Part VI.  In contrast to the 
conclusions of scholars opposed to mandatory disclosure, this Article concludes that the 
empirical evidence is strongly supportive of the view that mandatory disclosure often has 
socially beneficial effects.  Part VII offers some concluding remarks. 
     
II. THE TRADITIONAL CASE AGAINST MANDATORY DISCLOSURE  
 
  The earliest models of a firm’s disclosure decision, captured in the work of 
Sanford Grossman and Olivier Hart among others, contained a powerful result. In a world 
in which a firm has private information about the quality of its product and disclosure is 
costless, firms will voluntarily publicly disclose their private information as a signal of 
their product’s quality.
9 The reason for this result is both simple and powerful: firms will 
voluntarily disclose information so as not to be confused by customers with firms with 
lower quality products. Firms with high quality products will, therefore, voluntarily 
                                                 
9 See Sanford Grossman and Oliver Hart, Disclosure Laws and Takeover Bids, 35 Journal of Finance 323 
(1980); see also Stephen A. Ross, Disclosure Regulation in Financial Markets: Implications of Modern 
Finance Theory and Signaling Theory, in KEY ISSUES IN FINANCIAL REGULATION 177 (Franklin Edwards 
ed., 1979); Sanford Grossman, The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about Product 
Quality, 24 Journal of Law and Economics 461 (1981). In the Grossman-Hart model, there are sanctions for 
lying but no sanctions for non-disclosure.   9
commit to a disclosure regime that credibly commits the firm to full public disclosure.  
Firms with product quality a notch below that of the high quality firms will then 
voluntarily commit to a full disclosure regime so as not to be confused with firms with 
even lower quality. Eventually, the market completely unravels with all firms voluntarily 
disclosing their product quality even if their quality level is poor.   
  The elegant and intuitively appealing signaling story has been the main theoretical 
support for the view that market forces will ensure the optimal level of voluntary 
disclosure by firms.  Most prominently, Roberta Romano, in her articles advocating the 
removal of mandatory disclosure requirements, relies heavily upon this signaling story 
for her theoretical case against the need for mandated disclosure in securities regulation.
10  
Simply put, firms that wish to maximize the value of their shares will ensure that 
investors do not mistakenly assign a positive probability that the firm is withholding 
information that would reveal a low firm value and, hence, assign a low value to the 
firm’s shares.  Eventually, the market completely unravels with all firms voluntarily 
disclosing any private information they have concerning firm value even if their firm 
value is low.   
  The power of the signaling argument as applied to firm disclosure decisions 
retains some of its power despite the unrealistic assumption that disclosure is costless. 
Disclosure can obviously create a variety of costs for firms ranging from the cost of 
gathering, verifying and releasing information to the loss of competitive advantage 
resulting from the release of proprietary information. While these costs might lead a firm 
to rationally withhold disclosing some information if its disclosure is too costly, this 
simply means that firms will trade-off the costs and benefits of disclosure.
11  Who better 
to make this trade-off, many argue, than firms who will suffer the consequences of 
making the wrong decision? There is no reason to believe, after all, that firms will not 
                                                 
10 See, e.g., Roberta Romano, The Need for Competition in International Securities Regulation, 2 
Theoretical Inquires 387, 403  (“The signaling hypothesis regarding information disclosure is a plausible 
scenario in today’s capital markets . .. It is therefore theoretically difficult for advocates of mandated 
disclosure to maintain their normative claims . . . ”); cf. Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, 
Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 Va L. Rev. 669, 683 (1984) ("[o]nce the firm 
starts disclosing it cannot stop short of making any critical revelation, because investors always assume the 
worst. It must disclose the bad with the good, lest investors assume that the bad is even worse than it is."). 
11 See, e.g., Verrecchia, R., Discretionary Disclosure, 5 Journal of Accounting and Economics 365-380 
(1983) for a model in which disclosure is costly.   10
optimize their disclosure decision so that the marginal costs and benefits of disclosing are 
equated. 
  The signaling story, and hence its use as the linchpin for the case against 
mandatory disclosure, does, however, fall short as a basis for policy on two crucial 
dimensions.  First, the signaling argument relies on the assumption that those who set 
firm policy, such as entrenched managers and controlling shareholders, want to credibly 
commit to a disclosure regime that will maximize the market’s current valuation of the 
firm.  For the reasons given in Part III, for many firms in most countries this is simply not 
true. This group of unwilling firms can even include firms selling shares to the public for 
the first time.  Second, the signaling argument relies on the assumption that firms can 
credibly commit to any desired level of disclosure. Again, this is less likely to be true 
than one might initially have thought.  Part IV will explain why some firms are unable to 
credibly commit to a high level of disclosure even if they might find it in their self-
interest to do so. 
    
III.  DO FIRMS WANT TO CREDIBLY COMMIT? 
 
  The empirical evidence indicates that many controlling shareholders around the 
world divert corporate resources to themselves on a substantial scale. Moreover, logic 
and empirical evidence suggests that controlling shareholders' ability to engage in this 
lucrative diversion of corporate resources can be adversely affected by the imposition of 
mandatory disclosure requirements. Equally important, mandatory disclosure 
requirements can also have the effect of increasing competition for capital and 
competition in the product market, by decreasing the cost of external finance to new 
entrants and potential competitors, to the detriment of already existing firms owned by 
controlling shareholders.  These different considerations will now be discussed in detail.   11
 
A.  Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Diversion 
 
  Most firms around the world have controlling shareholders.
12  T h e  d i s p e r s e d  
ownership structures of the United States and the United Kingdom are an exception.  For 
this reason, it is crucial to consider the preferences of controlling shareholders when 
thinking about firms’ disclosure decisions for most firms around the world.  In the United 
States, in contrast, it is more important to focus on the preferences of managers of firms 
with dispersed ownership, who may have some degree of entrenchment against 
shareholder wishes, as well as those of the firms' shareholders.
13  
  Given the prevalence of concentrated ownership around the world, the potential 
conflict between the interests of controlling shareholders and those of minority 
shareholders is among the most important problems facing corporate and securities law in 
most countries.
14 As is widely recognized, controlling shareholders – once minority 
shareholders are in the picture – will tend to ignore the harm caused to minority 
shareholders’ interests in the course of deciding which actions the firm should undertake.  
More to the point, controlling shareholders will have an incentive to divert corporate 
assets to themselves at the expense of existing minority shareholders. 
  The empirical evidence strongly indicates that diversion of corporate resources by 
controlling shareholders is an economically important and widespread phenomenon, 
including in countries that have developed economies.  This empirical literature consists 
of studies that have attempted to directly measure the “private benefits of control” 
accruing to the controlling shareholder (and not to other shareholders) and studies 
                                                 
12 LaPorta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., and R. Vishny, Law and Finance, 106 Journal of Political 
Economy 1113, 1146 (1998); La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny, Legal 
Determinants of External Finance, 52 Journal of Finance 1131 (1997); see also Marco Becht and Alisa 
Roell, Blockholdings in Europe: An International Comparison, European Economic Review 3-9 (1999). 
13 For an index measuring managerial entrenchment for U.S. firms, see Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, and 
Allen Ferrell, What Matters in Corporate Governance?, Working Paper 2004.  The degree of managerial 
entrenchment, as measured by this index, is correlated – with 1% statistical significance – with firm 
valuation.  Moreover, firm valuation is monotonically decreasing in the entrenchment index. 
14 See generally Reinier Kraakman, Paul Davies, Henry Hansmann, Gerald Hertig, Klaus Hopt, Hideki 
Kanda, and Edward Rock, THE  ANATOMY OF CORPORATE  LAW (2004) (discussing the main issues in 
corporate and securities law).   12
documenting the widespread existence of so-called “tunneling” – the phenomenon of 
corporate assets being transferred from the firm to a controlling shareholder through a 
variety of mechanisms.
15  “Tunneling” includes such activities as transferring at below-
market prices assets from firms where the controlling shareholder has relatively low cash 
flow rights to firms where the controlling shareholder has higher cash flow rights. 
  Studies that have measured the “private benefits of control” enjoyed by 
controlling shareholders have consistently found that control of a company is typically 
worth a great deal, indicating that controlling shareholders are receiving benefits 
(including diversionary activities such as “tunneling”) not generally available to other 
shareholders as a result of that control.  In Italy, for instance, the average value of control 
is worth an amazing 37% of the equity value of the firm.
16  More generally, control was 
worth, on average, an impressive 14% of the equity value of the firm in a sample of 39 
countries. The sample included both developing and developed countries ranging from 
Colombia to the United States.
17 Other studies have likewise found that corporate control 
has, on average, a substantial economic value.
18  While the average is positive and 
substantial, there is nevertheless wide variation across countries. At one extreme, the 
estimated value of control in some countries, like Brazil, is in the range of 65% of the 
equity value of the firm.  At the other extreme, corporate control in Japan is estimated to 
be worth negative 4% of the equity value of the firm.   
  What are some of the private benefits of control commonly enjoyed by controlling 
shareholders? Several studies have documented that private benefits of control often take 
the form of “tunneling” in a wide range of countries. For instance, one study found that in 
India it is not uncommon for more than 25% of the profits in firms where the controlling 
                                                 
15 See Simon Johnson, Rafael LaPorta, and Andrei Shleifer, Tunneling, 90 American Economic Review 22 
(2000) for examples of tunneling. 
16 Luigi Zingales and Alexander Dyck, Private Benefits of Control: An International Comparison, 59 
Journal of Finance 537, 551 (2004).     
17 Id. 
18 See Tatiana Nenova, The Value of Corporate Votes and Control Benefits, 68 Journal of Financial 
Economics 104  (2003); Zingales, The Value of Voting Rights: A Study of the Milan Stock Exchange 
experience, 7 Review of Financial Studies 125-148 (1994); cf. Zingales, What determines the value of 
corporate votes?, 110 Quarterly Journal of Economics 1047 (1995). These studies find a substantial value 
placed on owning the control block in most cases despite the fact that control block ownership entails some 
potential costs as well, such as a lack of diversification.   13
shareholder had low cash flow rights to be transferred to firms where the controlling 
shareholder has high cash flow rights when there is a positive shock to the firm’s cash 
flow.
19 
 
B.  Disclosure and Corporate Diversion 
 
  Widespread diversion of firm assets by controlling shareholders has implications 
for firms’ disclosure decisions.  There are good reasons to believe that the more firms 
engage in diversion of corporate resources, all else being equal, the stronger controlling 
shareholders’ preferences for having these activities being kept hidden from public 
view.
20  A lax disclosure regime will likely have the effect of making it easier for 
controlling shareholders to divert corporate resources to their benefit, say “tunneling” a 
corporate asset at below-market prices to another firm in which the controlling 
shareholder has greater cash flow rights.  The more information available about a firm's 
operations, assets and ownership, the easier it is for shareholders and regulators to 
uncover when, how and to whom diversion is occurring.   
  Detection of diversion through increased disclosure might have a number of 
unwanted consequences for the controlling shareholder.  Detection might lead, of course, 
to legal action.  Even in countries with poor legal protections for investors there is some 
legal response, at least sporadically, to expropriation of firm assets that is sufficiently 
egregious. Indeed, in extreme enough cases, public pressure for regulators to do 
something might provoke some action.  In addition to any legal consequences, there 
might well be reputational costs for a controlling shareholder that has been publicly 
identified as particularly likely to engage in egregious conduct.  Recent empirical work 
suggests that a reputation for transparency and good governance can affect firm 
valuation.
21 
                                                 
19 Marianna Bertrand, Paras Mehta, and Sendhil Mullainathan, Ferreting out Tunneling: An Application to 
Indian Business Groups, 47 Quarterly Journal of Economics 121 (2002).    
20 This preference can exist even if everyone knows that firms, on average, are engaged in these activities.   
21  See Jordan Siegel, Can Foreign Firms Bond Themselves Effectively by Renting U.S. Securities Laws?, 
MIT Working Paper 2002.   14
  The empirical evidence is consistent with the view that it can be in the strong self-
interest of controlling shareholders who are enjoying high levels of private benefits of 
control for there to be low levels of firm transparency.
22  Some of this empirical work 
consists of several fairly recent empirical studies.  It is worth bearing in mind, by way of 
caution, that none of the relevant studies can definitively establish a causal link between 
firms' disclosure preferences and the level of private benefits of control (as is typically 
the case for studies in this area).  
  A recent study has found that the higher the level of private benefits of control of 
firms in a country the lower the level of disclosure (as captured by the degree of earnings 
management firms engage in) by firms in that country.
23 This cross-country study 
consisted of a sample of 31 countries, including developing as well as developed 
countries. Another recent finding is that an increase in mandatory disclosure requirements 
in a country is associated with a substantially lower level of private benefits of control for 
firms in that country.
24   
  Consistent with the view that increased disclosure can reduce the private benefits 
of control, Todd Mitton, in an important study of firms from Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, 
the Philippines and Thailand during the East Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998, found 
that firms with high levels of disclosure (by virtue of having securities trading in the 
United States or having an auditor from a "Big Six" accounting firm) had substantially 
better stock return performance during the crisis.
25  One plausible explanation for these 
abnormal stock returns is that diversion of corporate resources is likely to be particularly 
                                                 
22 This is not to say, of course, that the only factor affecting the level of private benefits of control is 
transparency, or even, more generally, the quality of the regulatory regime.  Other non-legal factors have 
been found to be important.  See, e.g., Marco Pagano and Paulo Volpin, The Political Economy of Finance, 
17 Oxford Review of Economic Policy 502-519 (2001). 
23 See Christian Leuz and Felix Oberholzer-Gee, Political Relationships, Global Financing and Corporate 
Transparency, Working Paper 2003.  
24 See Rafael La Porta, Florencio-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer, What Works in Securities Laws?, 
Working Paper 2004, p.16 (two-standard deviation increase in their “disclosure index” associated with a 
13% decrease in the premium paid for control blocks). 
25 Todd Mitton, A Cross-Firm Analysis of the Impact of Corporate Governance on the East Asian Financial 
Crisis, 64 Journal of Financial Economics 215 (2002) (having an ADR resulted in a higher stock return 
relative to other firms during the East Asian crisis of 10.8% and having a Big Six accounting firm was 
associated with a higher return of 8.1%).     15
severe during financial crises,
26 but firms with high levels of disclosure experienced 
lower levels of corporate diversion given the increased transparency of any diversion that 
is undertaken.  
  Another piece of empirical evidence comes from studies of firms that cross-list. 
Empirical research has found that the benefits to firms from countries with weak 
disclosure and investor protection regimes of cross-listing onto the U.S. exchanges are 
often substantial. Cross-listings are associated with more accurate analyst forecasts – 
arguably an indication of a richer information environment – and increased firm 
valuation.
27 Improvements in firm valuation are particularly significant for firms cross-
listing from countries with the weakest disclosure and investor protection regimes.
28   
  Despite the apparent substantial benefits of cross-listing, relatively few of the 
firms eligible for cross-listing take advantage of this opportunity.  Less than 10% of firms 
eligible for cross-listing onto the U.S. markets apparently do so.
29 Many firms are 
apparently satisfied with their regulatory environment and the associated high levels of 
private benefits of control, despite the cost in firm valuation.    
  Another study has investigated the effect of a country having an active media on 
the level of private benefits enjoyed by controlling shareholders.
30  The effects were quite 
strong. A one standard deviation increase in the level of the active press variable 
translated into a reduction in the value of the private benefits of control by some 6.4%. 
This evidence is consistent with an increased ability of the public to scrutinize 
questionable behavior, in this case through the activities of the press, limiting the ability 
of controlling shareholders to extract private benefits.   
                                                 
26 See Peter Boone, Alasdair Breach, Eric Friedman, and Simon Johnson, Corporate Governance in the 
Asian Crisis, 58 Journal of Financial Economics 141-186 (2000) (arguing that expropriation increased 
during the crisis) 
27 M. Lang, K. Lins, and D. Miller, ADRs, Analysts and Accuracy: Does Cross Listing Improve a Firm’s 
Information Environment?, Working Paper 2002.  
28 See C. Doidge, G. Karolyi, and R. Stulz, Why Are Foreign Firms Listed in the U.S. Worth More?, NBER 
Paper 8538 (2001). 
29 Id. at 1. 
30 See Luigi Zingales and Alexander Dyck, Private Benefits of Control: An International Comparison, 59 
Journal of Finance 537 (2004).  The level of activity of the press was proxied by the number of newspapers 
sold per 100,000 residents.   16
  Other studies have focused on politically-connected firms and firm transparency. 
Again, the evidence is consistent, not surprisingly, with firms having a preference for 
avoiding demanding disclosure regimes that might publicly expose uncomfortable facts. 
Politically-connected firms in Indonesia during the reign of Soeharto, for example, were 
significantly less likely to have securities publicly-traded abroad.  More specifically, 
these firms were significantly less likely to have debt or equity traded on the U.S 
exchanges and thereby avoided U.S. disclosure requirements.
31 One plausible explanation 
for this finding is that these firms desired to hide their questionable transactions with their 
political backers and state-owned banks. Causation is difficult to establish, however, as 
the availability of favorable financing from state banks could have reduced the need for 
external finance.
32 
  On a more general note, research has found that there is a negative correlation 
between the presence of controlling shareholders and the strength of the legal protections 
provided to investors.
33  One common explanation for this finding is that the private 
benefits of control are lower, and hence the attractiveness of retaining control reduced, 
the stronger the legal protections of investors  (such as mandatory disclosure 
requirements).
34  Outside investors, such as shareholders, will be willing to pay more for 
claims on the firm’s profits given the lower level of expected diversion of corporate 
resources. 
  Certain disclosures required under U.S. law are likely to be particularly useful in 
this regard.  The Exchange Act of 1934 often requires companies to disclose the identity 
                                                 
31 See Christian Leuz and Felix Oberholzer-Gee, Political Relationships, Global Financing and Corporate 
Transparency, Working Paper 2003. 
32  See id. at 3-4 discussing this possibility. 
33 See, e.g., Rafael La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer, Corporate Ownership around the 
World, 54 Journal of Finance 471 (1999).  The La Porta et al “anti-directors” index, a measure of the 
strength of legal protections provided investors, does not include mandatory disclosure requirements as one 
of its elements.  However, using an index that includes mandatory disclosure requirements appears to 
capture more of the important aspects of differences across countries than does the “anti-directors” index. 
See Rafael La Porta, Florencio-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer, What Works in Securities Laws?, Working 
Paper 2004.   Moreover, disclosure levels of firms in a country and that country’s “anti-directors” index 
are, not surprisingly, highly correlated.  See Christian Leuz, Dhannanjay Nanda and Peter Wysocki, 
Investor Protection and Earnings Management: An International Comparison, MIT Working Paper 2002. 
34 See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk, A Rent-Protection Theory of Corporate Ownership and Control, NBER 
Working Paper No. 7203 (1999) (fewer private benefits of control can lead to more dispersed ownership 
structures).   17
of any shareholder with more than 5% of the firm’s equity.
35 Indeed, disclosure 
requirements are so detailed in the U.S. that firms must disclose whether corporations 
allow executives to use the company jet for personal use.
36  Interestingly, the private 
benefits of control in the United States have been measured at the modest level of 1% of 
equity value.
37   
  Of course, the mere fact that controlling shareholders might want to opt into a lax 
disclosure regime does not by itself indicate that such a decision is socially undesirable. It 
is possible that the controlling shareholder values the diverted resources as much as the 
shareholders who would otherwise be the beneficiary.
38  In other words, diversion of 
corporate resources might constitute a mere transfer with no net social loss.  Moreover, 
the ability to engage in diversion might conceivably serve as compensation to the 
controller for the costs associated with monitoring the firm’s managers.  These costs 
might include a lack of diversification and liquidity associated with holding a large 
control block of stock in a single company and the time and effort incurred by the 
controller in the course of monitoring firm management.
39   
  In evaluating how likely it is that there are no net social losses associated with a 
lax disclosure regime, two considerations need to be kept in mind.  First, even if private 
benefits of control, including the ability to “tunnel” assets, merely represent a transfer 
from minority shareholders to controlling shareholders or efficient compensation for the 
monitoring services provided by the controller, the effects of a lax disclosure regime – 
adopted as a means to protect these transfers – on competition, growth and financial 
development must be considered in evaluating the social desirability of a lax disclosure 
regime. Once these effects are taken into account, it is questionable how innocuous the 
                                                 
35 See Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. section 781-m (1994). 
36 See David Yermack, Flights of Fancy, Working Paper 2004 (studying effect of disclosures concerning 
use of company jet on stock prices). 
37  Luigi Zingales and Alexander Dyck, Private Benefits of Control: An International Comparison, 59 
Journal of Finance 537, 551 (2004).   
38 Most models of expropriation, however, do assume that there is a cost associated with diversion of 
corporate resources.  See, e.g., Burkhart, Gromb and Panunzi, Why Higher Takeover Premia Protect 
Minority Shareholders, 106 Journal of Political Economy 172-204 (1998). 
39 See Admatti, Pfleiderer and Zechner, Large Shareholder Activism, Risk Sharing, and Financial Market 
Equilibrium, Journal of Political Economy 1097 (1994) (discussing the costs associated with holding large 
blocks).  Of course, if control is guaranteed by holding shares with disproportionate voting rights, the 
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decision to opt into a poor disclosure regime really is. The empirical evidence, which will 
be discussed in Part III.C, is consistent with the effects of lax disclosure regimes on 
competition, growth and financial development being both detrimental and nontrivial.   
  Second, it is also worth emphasizing that once firms have sold shares to minority 
shareholders, controlling shareholders will not necessarily find a firm value-maximizing 
disclosure regime in their self-interest for the simple reason that some of the benefits of 
such a regime will accrue to the benefit of minority shareholders.
40 Minority shareholders 
would benefit because they were able to initially purchase their shares at a discount 
reflecting a higher expected level of diversion than is possible under a more demanding 
regime.
41  Selling shares at such a discount might be the optimal course of action if it 
turns out that, at the time the shares were sold, there happened not to be a demanding 
disclosure regime available and supporting the creation of such a demanding disclosure 
regime was either infeasible or would have created potentially unwanted competition. 
 
C.  Disclosure and Competition 
 
1.  Reducing the Cost of External Finance 
 
  Besides affecting the ability of controlling shareholders to divert corporate 
resources, the presence of a demanding disclosure regime has another potentially 
important effect. A demanding disclosure regime can lead to a lower cost of capital for 
firms reliant on external finance. This consequence is potentially quite important for 
those firms that do not have sufficient internal sources of capital to capitalize on 
investment opportunities. This group of firms would likely include young firms with 
high-growth prospects but relatively few internal sources of capital.  Larger, more-
                                                 
40 See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk and Mark Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and 
Governance in CONVERGENCE AND PERSISTENCE IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 69, 83-92 (2004) 
41 See Andrei Shleifer and Daniel Wolfenzon, Investor Protection and Equity Markets, 66 Journal of 
Financial Economics 3, 17-18 (2002) (proposition 9). The Shleifer-Wolfenzon model is cast in terms of 
investors' legal protections.  Their model is easily adopted to apply to disclosure requirements.   See 
Michael Greenstone, Paul Oyer and Annettee Vissing-Jorgensen, The Effects of Equity Market Regulation: 
Evidence from the Securities Acts Amendments of 1964, Working Paper 2004 for an adoption of Shleifer-
Wolfenzon model to the mandatory disclosure requirement context.   19
established firms are more likely to have internal sources of capital as well as well-
established ties to banks and other financial institutions that can provide credit. 
  There are at least three mechanisms by which a demanding disclosure regime can 
reduce the cost of external finance: by reducing adverse selection costs; reducing the 
level of private information held by traders; and reducing the expected level of diversion 
of corporate resources.  Consider first the effect of demanding disclosure on adverse 
selection costs.  A standard set of models in corporate finance indicate that there is an 
adverse selection cost to raising external finance that can be reduced with improved 
disclosure. In the absence of sufficient firm-specific public information, the market will 
assign a positive probability that a firm with valuable assets – such as a firm with 
substantial profits and promising growth prospects – is in fact a firm with low-value 
assets.
42  This makes it less likely that high-value firms will raise external finance to fund 
attractive investment opportunities as their shares will sell at a discount to their true 
value.  This discount represents the adverse selection cost to these high-value firms of 
raising external finance.  Improved disclosure of firm-specific information at the time the 
firm is raising capital makes it more likely that high-value firms will raise external 
finance given the increased ability of the market to differentiate between high-value and 
low-value firms.
43 
  The second reason why the cost of external finance might be lower in a regime 
with demanding disclosure requirements is the effect such a regime has on the level of 
private information about the true value of the firm held by traders.  Credible, public firm 
disclosures can have the effect of displacing information that was, or would have been, 
generated by privately-informed traders.
44 This is important because recent theoretical 
and empirical research indicates that securities with a high level of private-information 
                                                 
42 The classic adverse selection papers are Myers, Stewart C. and Nicholas S. Majluf, Corporate Financing 
and Investment Decisions when Firms have Information that Investors do not have, 13 Journal of Financial 
Economics 187-221 (1984) and Stewart Myers, The Capital Structure Puzzle, 39 Journal of Finance 575 
(1984). 
43 Consistent with this, voluntary levels of disclosure by firms are higher around the time firms access the 
capital markets for capital.  See Lang, M. and R. Lundholm, Cross-Sectional Determinants of Analyst 
Ratings of Corporate Disclosures, 31 Journal of Accounting Research, Autumn 246-271 (1993)  
44 For evidence that firm public disclosures can displace private information, see Brown, Stephen, Mark 
Finn, and Stephen Hillegeist, Disclosure Policies and the Probability of Informed Trade, Working Paper 
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trading have higher expected returns. And, of course, a higher expected return, all else 
being equal, implies a higher cost of capital.  This association between levels of private 
information trading and expected returns suggests that there is value to a firm of not only 
credibly committing to meeting demanding disclosure standards at the time external 
finance is being raised, but also credibly committing at the same time to meeting 
demanding disclosure requirements in the future as well.  The theoretical and empirical 
literature on this association will be discussed in further detail in Part V.   
  Finally, the availability of external finance can be enhanced by mandatory 
disclosure because a firm can demand more per share if it is able to credibly commit to a 
low level of diversion of corporate assets through such a disclosure regime.  The equity 
of a firm will be worth more because a larger percentage of the firm’s profits will end up 
being used for the benefit of all the shareholders.  Moreover, an increase in the amount of 
publicly available information could also have the effect of reducing the costs to minority 
shareholders of monitoring controlling shareholders and management to ensure that 
corporate diversion is not occurring.
45  The reduced cost of external finance for firms that 
have attractive investment opportunities and can credibly commit to reduced levels of 
diversion can result in a reallocation of capital from firms that have less attractive 
investment opportunities to those with more attractive investment opportunities.
46 These 
reduced agency costs suggest another potential benefit to having ongoing disclosure 
requirements, rather than just mandated disclosure at the time external finance is raised. 
  A reduced cost of external finance for firms issuing securities also has 
implications for the availability of venture capital financing for these firms prior to the 
time they ultimately issue securities to the public.  The option for venture capitalists to 
“cash out” their investments by selling securities in the firm to the public on favorable 
terms in the event that the company is successful could very well make it more likely that 
                                                 
45 See David Lombardo and Marco Pagano, Law and Equity Markets: A Simple Model, CSEF Working 
Paper No. 25 (2002) (modeling the effect of reduced monitoring costs on the equilibrium rate of return on 
equity). 
46 See Andrei Shleifer and Daniel Wolfenzon, Investor Protection and Equity Markets, 66 Journal of 
Financial Economics 3 (2002) (establishing this result when capital is not perfectly mobile across 
countries).   21
venture capital funding will be forthcoming in the first place.
47 One study has 
documented that venture capital funding increases in the aftermath of countries 
introducing more demanding mandatory disclosure requirements.
48 
  The empirical evidence is consistent with the presence of a demanding disclosure 
regime enabling firms (such as cash-poor, high-growth firms) to raise needed external 
finance on favorable terms.  Studies have found that many of the firms that cross-list into 
the United States, and thereby commit themselves to the U.S. disclosure regime, are in 
fact cash-poor, high-growth firms from countries with poor disclosure regimes (and poor 
investor protections generally) that need to raise external finance.
49  Cross-listing, either 
through reputational or legal bonding, apparently enables firms to credibly commit to a 
demanding disclosure regime.   
  More generally, countries whose firms have higher levels of transparency in their 
earnings reports enjoy lower costs of capital.
50 Consistent with this, industries and firms 
in countries with strong investor protection requirements rely more on external finance to 
raise capital.  For instance, countries with stronger investor protection requirements have 
a larger number of firms going public (relative to the country’s GDP).
51 
Comparing the relative success of the different securities regulations instituted by 
the Czech Republic and Poland in the 1990s is instructive.
52  One of the most striking 
differences between these countries’ two regimes was in their disclosure requirements.  
While Poland imposed demanding disclosure requirements on firms with publicly-traded 
                                                 
47 See Bernard Black and Ronald Gilson, Venture Capital and the Structure of Capital Markets: Banks 
versus Stock Markets, 47 Journal of Financial Economics 307 (1998). 
48 See Rafangum Rajan, and Luigi Zingales Rajan, SAVING CAPITALISM FROM THE CAPITALISTS 85 (2003) 
discussing evidence gathered by Jorg Kukies in Stock Markets for High-Technology Firms and Venture 
Capital Funding: Evidence from Europe (PhD Dissertation, University of Chicago, 2001). 
49 See Marco Pagano, Alisa Roell, and Josef Zechner, The Geography of Equity Listing: Why do European 
Companies List Abroad?, CSEF Working Paper No.28 (1999) (high-growth firms in need of external 
finance more likely to cross-list onto the U.S. markets); W. Reese and M. Weisbach, Protection of Minority 
Shareholder Interests, Cross-listing in the United States, and Subsequent Equity Offerings, 66 Journal of 
Financial Economics 65-104 (2002) (firms planning to raise capital tend to cross-list).   
50 See Battacharya, Daouk and Michael Welker, The World Price of Earnings Opacity, Working Paper 
2002 (study of 34 countries over the 1985-1998 period). 
51 See Rafeal La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny, Legal Determinants of 
External Finance, 52 Journal of Finance 1131 (1997). 
52 See generally John C. Coffee, Privatization and Corporate Governance: The Lessons from Securities 
Market Failure, 25 J. Corp. L. 1 (1999) and Edward Glaeser, Simon Johnson, and Andrei Shleifer, Coase 
versus the Coasians, 116 Quarterly Journal of Economics 853 (2001).   22
securities, the Czech Republic did very little.  For instance, securities could not begin 
trading on Poland’s markets unless a firm prospectus was available.  The Czech Republic 
required none.  Poland required monthly, quarterly and semi-annual disclosures by firms.  
The Czech Republic did not require that any of these disclosures be made.  Poland’s level 
of financial development, including initial public offerings and the level of external 
finance raised, far exceeded that of the Czech Republic throughout the 1990s.
53 Perhaps 
not coincidentally, the private benefits of control in Poland were 11% of firm value while 
in the Czech Republic they were 58% of firm value.
54 
 
  2.  Increasing Competition 
  
  More demanding disclosure requirements have an important effect not only on 
firms that rely on external finance, but also for those firms – such as large, well-
established, low-growth firms – that do not.  Better financing opportunities for potential 
competitors is generally not in the interests of these firms.
55  Therefore, in addition to 
protecting any private benefits of control that may exist, these firms have an additional 
and separate reason to be strongly opposed to the institution of a more demanding 
disclosure regime.  These firms will be opposed to a demanding disclosure regime being 
made available to (potential) competitors that rely on external finance.  Recent empirical 
evidence points to exactly how these firms will be disadvantaged by improved disclosure 
requirements. 
  Firms in industries with significant needs for external finance (high growth 
opportunities relative to internal cash flows), such as the pharmaceutical industry with its 
substantial costs of drug development, grew substantially faster during the 1980s in 
countries with more demanding accounting disclosure standards than firms in those same 
                                                 
53 See Edward Glaeser, Simon Johnson, and Andrei Shleifer, Coase versus the Coasians, 116 Quarterly 
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54 See Luigi Zingales and Alexander Dyck, Private Benefits of Control: An International Comparison, 59 
Journal of Finance 537, 563 (2004).   
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industries in countries with weak accounting disclosure standards.
56  Equally important, 
the same study found that there was more competition in these external finance-
dependent industries, as measured by the number of new entrants, in countries with 
demanding accounting standards.
57  In other words, in industries that heavily depend on 
external finance for funding, competition increased as a result of the presence of 
demanding mandatory disclosure requirements. The losers of more demanding mandatory 
disclosure requirements appear to be firms with sufficient sources of internal capital for 
their investments.   
  Or consider the effect on a firm from a country with a poor disclosure regime of 
other firms cross-listing onto a foreign exchange.  Several studies have examined the 
effect of a firm’s decision to cross-list onto the U.S. markets on similarly-situated firms 
that do not cross-list.  These studies have found that firms not cross-listing experience a 
negative stock price reaction.
58  One needs to be cautious, however, in interpreting these 
findings. While these studies do indicate that non-cross-listed firms are apparently 
harmed by the cross-listing decisions of other firms, it is not clear from these studies what 
is responsible for this negative price reaction; the prospect of increased competition due 
to increased access to capital for the firms’ rivals or the possibility that the market draws 
a negative inference about the non-listing firms (such as their growth prospects). 
  The ability of a firm to credibly commit to a demanding disclosure regime not 
only increases competition in the product market, by funding new entrants, but can also 
increase competition between firms for capital.  This can lead some firms to oppose a 
demanding mandatory disclosure regime even if they have not yet sold (although they are 
planning to) shares to the public. If capital is not perfectly mobile across borders (i.e. the 
supply of capital is not perfectly elastic), a situation which appears to be the case for most 
                                                 
56 See R. Rajan and L. Zingales, Financial Dependence and Growth, 88 American Economic Review 3, 
559-586 (1998). 
57  See id. at 572. 
58 See Michael Melvin and Magali Valero-Tonone, The Effects of International Cross-Listing on Rival 
Firms, Working Paper 2003; Dong W. Lee, Why do ADR Program Announcements Increase Shareholder 
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countries,
59 then an enhanced ability of some firms to receive external finance through 
credibly committing to a demanding disclosure regime implies that the country’s interest 
rate increases.
60  More demand for external finance, all else being equal, implies a higher 
interest rate in equilibrium given the fact that capital is scarce.  Firms that are planning a 
securities offering now face, unhappily, a higher discount rate (i.e. the economy’s interest 
rate) for the shares they are selling.  Indeed, some firms will not be able to raise sufficient 
capital by selling shares unless they operate in a lax disclosure regime given the higher 
discount rate associated with increased competition for capital. 
  Supporting these theoretical predictions, Davide Lombardo and Marco Pagano 
found that countries with higher quality legal regimes (as captured by indexes that 
capture a country’s respect for the rule of law and the efficiency of the country’s judicial 
system) have higher risk-adjusted returns.
61 Also consistent with these predictions is the 
finding in another recent study that stock markets which impound more firm-specific 
information are associated with an improvement in the allocation of capital across 
industries.
62 Interestingly, other empirical studies have found that mandatory disclosure is 
associated with more firm-specific information being impounded into stock prices.
63 
  Moreover, empirical research has found that there is an improvement in capital 
allocation in countries with strong legal protections for investors.
64 This improved 
allocation of capital from stronger legal protections resulted in “declining industries” 
receiving less funding relative to those in firms with better growth prospects.  In other 
                                                 
59 See Geert Bekaert and Campbell Harvey, Time-Varying World Market Integration, 50 Journal of Finance 
2, 403-444 (1995); Campbell Harvey, Predictable Risk and Return in Emerging Markets, 8 Review of 
Financial Studies 3, 773-816 (1995). 
60 There are several formal models that capture these effects on the interest rate.  See David Lombardo and 
Marco Pagano, Law and Equity Markets: A Simple Model, CSEF Working Paper No. 25; Andrei Shleifer 
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words, “declining industries” appear to be losers in legal systems with more demanding 
investor rights.
65   
  In short, there is an extensive (and growing) body of evidence that is consistent 
with a number of firms having a powerful reason to be opposed to more demanding 
disclosure requirements if this means that these disclosure requirements will likewise be 
made available to other firms. Improved disclosure can have the effect of increasing 
competition by enabling firms without sufficient internal sources of capital to receive 
funding. This competition can take the form of increased competition for scarce capital 
and increased product market competition. Competition, and the “creative destruction” of 
firms that it unleashes, is potentially quite threatening to established firms with internal 
sources of cash and well-established ties to banks and other financial institutions as well 
as those firms that wish not to compete with others for the external finance they receive.  
  It is worth emphasizing that the desire to suppress competition through neglect of 
the legal infrastructure necessary to create and support robust competition can exist even 
if there are no controlling shareholders who are enjoying, and wish to continue enjoying, 
substantial private benefits of control.  Moreover, firms can have this preference for a lax 
disclosure regime for this anti-competitive reason even at the time they are selling shares 
to the public, despite the discount in share price this will cause. 
  Of course, when there are in fact substantial private benefits of control present, 
these empirical studies indicate that there is likely a real, and potentially quite significant, 
cost in terms of foregone competition, growth and financial development resulting from a 
preference on the part of controlling shareholders for a lax disclosure regime as a means 
of retaining their ability to divert corporate resources unimpeded.  This is true even if 
such diversion is largely a mere transfer between shareholders or such diversion 
represents, in part, compensation to the controller for its monitoring costs.    
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D.  Firms That Still Want to Commit 
 
  As has been mentioned, there will undoubtedly be some firms that do want to 
commit to a high-quality disclosure regime. This group might include some controlling 
shareholders who are willing to forgo the opportunity to divert some corporate resources 
in order to capture the increase in the value of the controller’s ownership stake associated 
with operating under a high-quality disclosure regime.  In other words, the controller’s 
share of the efficiency gains from selecting a higher quality disclosure regime might, if 
the magnitude is sufficiently large, more than offset the controller’s decreased ability to 
divert corporate resources.
66  While substantial private benefits of control are common 
around the world, there are still a number of countries where the average private benefits 
are modest. Even in situations where private benefits of control are high, some 
controlling shareholders might want to attempt to capture the efficiency gains from 
improved corporate governance by purchasing the minority shareholder stakes at 
depressed prices and then commit to a firm value maximizing disclosure (and investor 
protections rights) regime.
67  And, finally, this group of willing firms will also likely 
include some firms that need to raise external finance and venture capital funding to 
capitalize on investment opportunities.   
  All this leads to the following question: Why should policymakers be concerned 
about the disclosure levels of those firms that want to credibility commit to a disclosure 
regime that maximizes firm valuation and reduces the cost of external finance? If there 
are firms that wish to credibly commit will not the market or a responsive government 
provide a means for these firms to do so?  As it turns out, there are powerful reasons for 
why government and the market might not provide the necessary tools for this group of 
firms to credibly commit to a high-disclosure regime even when they find it in their self-
interest to do so. 
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IV.  CAN FIRMS CREDIBLY COMMIT? 
 
A.  The Political Economy of Vested Interests 
 
  There are four different possibilities for how a firm might credibly commit to a 
demanding disclosure regime.  First, the government, perhaps responding to firm demand 
for better disclosure requirements, could provide such a disclosure regime. Second, the 
exchange in the firm’s country, through its listing requirements, could ensure that certain 
disclosure standards be met for exchange-listed firms. Third, firms in countries with lax 
disclosure regimes might cross-list onto exchanges in countries that provide a more 
demanding disclosure regime.  Fourth, firms in their individual capacity could attempt, 
through various contractual and corporate charter provisions, to create such a regime for 
themselves.   
  Whether government responds to the demands of some firms to make improved 
disclosure standards available to them will be impacted by the opposition of those firms – 
often the larger, well-established firms – to the prospect of increased competition. It is 
not surprising that in many instances governments around the world, perhaps responding 
to this powerful interest group, have failed to provide the legal infrastructure that would 
enable firms to commit to a high-quality disclosure regime despite the possibility that 
there are firms that crave a high-quality disclosure regime.
68  The true costs to the public 
at large of such inaction are often not readily apparent. 
  In considering the likely response by domestic exchanges to a demand for 
improved disclosure requirements, it is worth bearing in mind that a number of the likely 
firm beneficiaries of improved access to external finance and venture capital are likely 
not even listed, or eligible for listing, on the exchange given their firm size and stage of 
development.  Indeed, some exchanges require that a firm be profitable for a certain 
number of years before they are even eligible for listing, exactly those firms that are least 
likely to have internal sources of capital or well-established ties to financial institutions. 
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In other words, the beneficiaries of improved disclosure standards will often be outsiders 
to the internal decision-making process of the exchange when it is setting its listing 
standards.  Not surprisingly, exchanges have proven quite responsive to the demands of 
its largest listed firms; those firms least likely to be the primary beneficiaries of a lower 
cost of external finance or increased venture capital funding.   
  The famous one-share one-vote controversy over the New York Stock Exchange’s 
(NYSE) listing rules is a good illustration of this solicitousness.  The NYSE had since 
1926 an exchange listing rule expressly prohibiting dual class common stock.
69  A rule, 
incidentally, that had received significant academic support as good policy.
70 When 
General Motors, one of the larger NYSE-listed companies, issued dual class common 
stock in 1982 in clear violation of this rule, the NYSE refused to take any action against 
General Motors.  Indeed, the NYSE seriously considered changing its longstanding rule 
prohibiting dual class common stock in response to General Motors’ actions.  The issue 
was finally moot when the SEC stepped in and restricted the use of dual class common 
through regulation.
71 
  There is also some evidence that a similar dynamic was at work in the pre-
mandatory disclosure period in the United States.  The NYSE appeared to be reluctant to 
impose meaningful disclosure requirements on listed firms at the turn of the century due 
to the opposition of firms with controlling shareholders, often families, who preferred not 
to be bound to disclose information.
72  Not until the exchange was under intense 
governmental pressure did the NYSE meaningfully improve its disclosure requirements 
in 1910.
73 
  The failure of government or an exchange to create a meaningful disclosure 
regime can, of course, be a reasonable decision.  Creating a mandatory disclosure regime, 
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with meaningful levels of enforcement, is an expensive and, perhaps even more 
importantly, complicated undertaking. To the extent there is court involvement in 
enforcement, perhaps adjudicating lawsuits or reviewing a governmental agency’s 
enforcement actions, the court system must be up to the task.  This includes tolerable 
levels of judicial corruption and some minimal level of expertise on the part of judges in 
assessing the merits of these actions. The same will be true for any private enforcement 
and adjudication process that might be established by an exchange. In addition, 
establishing workable definitions of concepts likely to be central in any mandatory 
disclosure regime, such as what constitutes a “material” misstatement, is likely to prove, 
if the U.S. experience is any guide, to be a complicated endeavor.  Moreover, there will 
inevitably be a need in any mandatory disclosure regime for regulations and guidelines to 
be continually clarified and updated as business conditions change and new fact patterns 
present themselves.   
  All of this is to say that there are nontrivial costs that a country or an exchange 
must incur if it is going to establish a meaningful mandatory disclosure regime for firms 
with publicly-traded securities.  Incurring these costs at any point in time will only make 
sense if there are sufficient number of firms with publicly-traded securities, or 
considering going public, that might benefit from such a regime at that time.   
  But this creates a serious timing problem. In a situation where there is, perhaps 
quite reasonably, a poor disclosure and investor rights regime, the most efficient outcome 
might very well be the presence of controlling shareholders who can monitor 
management and internalize the costs of expropriation.
74 And, in fact, developing 
countries have a strong tendency towards concentrated ownership.
75 Controlling 
shareholders of firms that already have minority shareholders by the time it begins to 
make sense to incur the costs of establishing a mandatory disclosure regime will have an 
incentive to oppose a change in the disclosure regime irrespective of whether the change 
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is being considered by government or the firms' exchange.
76  And, likewise, entrenched 
managers of firms with dispersed ownership structures will attempt to protect any private 
benefits of control they enjoy.  To make matters worse, non-controlling shareholders of 
these firms might also find it in their interest to oppose the adoption of a more demanding 
disclosure regime, even if this were to reduce the incidence of corporate diversion by 
controlling shareholders and entrenched managers to their benefit, if the result is likely to 
be an increase in the level of competition faced by the firm.   
  This is not to say that these vested interests can never be overcome.  That is 
obviously false. It is merely to say that the fact that firms in a country or an exchange 
operate under a lax disclosure regime does not imply that mandated disclosure can not 
substantially improve matters.  To this point, the analysis has focused on the political 
economy implications of having firms with a vested interest in a lax disclosure regime. 
But how does the willingness of an exchange to impose demanding disclosure 
requirements through its listing standards change when competition between exchanges is 
introduced? 
 
B.  Competition Between Domestic Exchanges 
  
  Competition between exchanges is an important issue to consider.  A number of 
commentators have argued that competition between exchanges for trading volume and 
company listings will ensure that firms both can and will commit to a demanding 
disclosure regime.    
 
1.  Theory 
   
  The desire to attract the trading volume of investors will ensure, the argument 
goes, that exchanges institute demanding disclosure requirements as a prerequisite to 
listing on the exchange. This is so because investors value disclosure and will route their 
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stock orders accordingly.  Based on this reasoning, Paul Mahoney and others have argued 
that exchanges should be vested with the responsibility of setting disclosure standards.
77   
  How this competition for trading volume and listing business will work out has 
been fleshed out in different ways.  Paul Mahoney, for instance, argues that “[o]ne 
important source of risk [to investors] is the divergence of investor viewpoints about the 
company’s performance.  The company can reduce this divergence by making financial 
and other disclosures.”
78  As result, this will increase the “desirability of listed companies 
as investment vehicles.”
79  Huddart, Hughes and Brunnermeier (HHB), to take another 
prominent example, have attempted to capture in a formal model the intuition that 
exchanges competing to maximize trading volume will offer demanding disclosure 
standards.
80  In the HHB model, exchanges will attempt to capture the trading done by 
uninformed, liquidity traders – traders who have no private information about the firms' 
true value but need to trade given their liquidity needs – even while simultaneously 
attempting to attract listings from firms whose corporate insiders wish to engage in 
insider trading using their private information about their firm’s true value. The model’s 
implication that there will be a “race to the top” in terms of disclosure standards relies on 
the plausible assumption that uninformed liquidity traders prefer not to trade, all else 
being equal, against informed traders. An exchange with a demanding disclosure regime 
reduces the likelihood in their model that uninformed liquidity traders are trading against 
informed traders.  Corporate insiders prefer to conduct their trades where they can “hide” 
among a large number of liquidity traders even at the expense of having some of their 
private information publicly revealed as a result of the exchange disclosure rules.  Hence, 
exchanges will voluntarily offer demanding disclosure standards given their preference, a 
preference shared by corporate insiders, to attract the trades of liquidity traders. 
  Neither of these particular lines of reasoning is entirely convincing. As for the 
Mahoney argument, the precise connection between the desirability of a security as an 
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investment and divergence of investor viewpoints is not spelled out.  Even assuming that 
a decrease in the divergence of investor viewpoints will result in reduced systematic risk, 
this will not necessarily render the securities more attractive as an investment, as the risk-
adjusted return will, in an efficient market, remain the same.  Investors will simply enjoy 
a lower return as a result of bearing less systematic risk.  At this point, the relative 
attractiveness of securities with high disclosure and those with low disclosure as an 
investment will remain the same.  
  Nor does the HHB model constitute a firm basis for arguing that exchanges will 
institute demanding disclosure requirements and, thereby, ensure that listed firms meet 
demanding disclosure standards even in the absence of mandatory disclosure.  The HHB 
model normalizes all securities returns, regardless of where the security trades, to zero.
81  
It is this assumption that drives their conclusion that liquidity traders have a preference 
for high disclosure exchanges given the fact that the only difference between securities 
trading on different exchanges is the probability of incurring a loss by trading against 
informed traders.  However, it is very much an open question in the finance literature 
whether securities with higher levels of informed trading have the same return as 
securities with lower levels of informed trading – an issue that will be explored in more 
detail shortly in Part V. Fundamentally, they formally make the assumption implicit in 
Mahoney’s argument: Exchange features that are unattractive to investors, such as lax 
disclosure standards, are not priced by the market. 
  Most importantly, neither argument addresses what happens when exchange rules 
affect the ability of those who control firms to engage in diversion of corporate assets or 
the level of competition faced by the firm.  An ability, incidentally, that is not obviously 
affected by which exchange attracts liquidity traders. An exchange will have a powerful 
incentive to provide a lax disclosure regime if enough listed companies on an exchange, 
or firms eligible for listing on the exchange, have an interest in a poor disclosure regime 
even if this implies a higher cost of external finance for firms as a result of undesirable 
exchange rules being priced by the market.  Indeed, an attempt by an exchange to 
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maximize trading volume might very well lead it to offer a lax disclosure regime so as to 
maximize the number of listed securities traded on the exchange.    
  The experience of the U.S. in the pre-mandatory disclosure period (pre-1933) has 
often been relied upon in attempting to figure whether exchanges will adopt demanding 
disclosure requirements out of self-interest.  It is on this experience that the discussion 
will now focus. 
 
      2.  The U.S.’s Pre- Mandatory Disclosure Experience 
 
  A common claim is that the existence of demanding disclosure requirements 
imposed by exchanges in the U.S. in the decades immediately prior to the imposition of 
mandatory disclosure in the 1930s is powerful evidence that exchanges, left 
unencumbered, have the proper incentives when setting disclosure requirements through 
their listing standards.
82  During this pre-mandatory disclosure period, the NYSE, while 
the most important exchange, faced domestic competition from some thirty-three other 
exchanges, some with significant trading volume.   
  And, indeed, it is true that the disclosure standards a firm had to meet as a 
condition to listing on the NYSE, as of 1931, were extensive.  Firms had to provide 
balance sheets and income statements for the prior two years and earnings statements for 
the prior five years.  These balance sheet and income statements had to be updated 
periodically.  Firms also had to provide a written description of how it calculated 
depreciation.  Depreciation methods could not be changed without publicly providing 
details of any change in its annual report.
83  
  There are several reasons, however, for why the demanding nature of the NYSE’s 
listing requirements, circa 1931, is not as powerful a piece of evidence against the need 
for mandatory disclosure as often claimed.  The NYSE’s requirement that firms update 
their financial statements – a crucial component of any meaningful disclosure regime – 
were in fact, in large part, a result of governmental pressure.  Prior to the Panic of 1907, 
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the NYSE placed no general obligation on listed firms to periodically update their 
financial information.
84  Moreover, the NYSE prior to the Panic of 1907 allowed 
securities of firms not listed on the exchange to nevertheless trade (so-called unlisted 
trading) on the exchange.  The volume of unlisted trading transactions on the NYSE was 
substantial with very little in the way of firm disclosures by unlisted firms.
85  These 
unlisted firms did not have to meet the disclosure requirements contained in the NYSE’s 
listing standards.   
  The Hughes Commission, established by the state of New York in the aftermath 
of the Panic of 1907, was charged with investigating the practices of the NYSE.
86  As a 
result of its investigation, the Hughes Commission Report (herein "Report") 
recommended that the NYSE “adopt methods to compel the filing of frequent statements 
of the financial condition of the companies whose securities are listed, including balance 
sheets [and] income accounts.”  Moreover, the Report recommended that the “unlisted 
department, except for temporary issues, [ ] be abolished.”
87  Wisely, the NYSE adopted 
most of the Report’s recommendations, including enforcing an obligation to periodically 
update balance sheet and income statements and the prohibition of unlisted trading.
88  
  Nor was the NYSE alone.  The New York Curb Exchange, an important 
competitor to the NYSE, was strongly criticized in the Report for its lack of listing 
standards.  After the Report’s recommendations came out, the New York Curb Exchange 
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adopted listing standards.
89  These listing standards were later significantly strengthened 
in the aftermath of the crash of 1929 when the New York Curb Exchange’s practices 
were the subject of Senate hearings.  
  Moreover, while the NYSE had extensive disclosure requirements in place by 
1931 it is highly questionable whether there was any meaningful enforcement of these 
requirements.  At the end of the day, the only penalty that the NYSE could impose for 
non-compliance was de-listing.  Not surprisingly, this was an action undertaken in only 
the rarest of cases. 
  Finally, when one looks at exchanges other than the NYSE the disclosure 
requirements, and their enforcement, were quite lax.  For instance, the Chicago Stock 
Exchange had no requirement that financial information disclosed by listed companies 
ever be updated.
90  While unlisted trading was barred on the NYSE after 1910, unlisted 
trading, with little or no disclosure requirements, continued to constitute a substantial 
portion of trading on many of the other exchanges. 
  None of this is to suggest that exchanges have no incentive to impose disclosure 
standards.  Nor does the U.S. history of listing standards even show that exchanges in the 
pre-mandatory disclosure period adopted insufficiently rigorous disclosure standards. A 
recital of disclosure standards and enforcement mechanisms cannot establish this. What 
the historical evidence canvassed above does undermine, though, is the common claim 
that the pre-1933 U.S. experience demonstrates that demanding mandatory disclosure 
requirements are unnecessary as these will be provided by exchanges. 
  Nor did most firms, on their own, voluntarily submit meaningful annual reports 
before 1910.  Indeed, many important firms, such as the American Sugar Refining 
Company, at this time released no annual reports.  The annual reports that were released 
tended to be quite short with relatively little in the way of detail.  Major companies, such 
as the International Silver Company and the American Tin Plate Company, whose stock 
was traded on the NYSE, released very few details of any sort in their annual report. The 
Eastman Kodak annual report of 1903, replicated in the Appendix, is representative of a 
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number of annual reports of this time period.   This being said, there were nevertheless 
some companies, most notably U.S. Steel starting with its annual report of 1903, that did 
provide relatively in-depth financial information.
91  In short, the overall level of 
disclosure contained in the annual reports during this time period was low, but not 
uniformly low. 
  In considering the relevance of the U.S. experience for other countries, it is worth 
noting that in many countries there simply is no meaningful competition between 
domestic exchanges. Many countries have a single, dominant domestic exchange where 
most order flow is executed. This is not surprising given the powerful liquidity network 
externalities of trading: traders want to trade where other traders already are.  Moreover, 
many exchanges around the world are far from independent, market organizations. 
Government supervision and oversight of exchanges has historically been far greater, for 
example, in Continental Europe than the U.S.
92   
 
C.  International Competition for Listings 
 
  Competition between a country’s domestic exchanges is not, of course, the only 
source of competition. There is increasing international competition between exchanges, 
which undoubtedly can powerfully change the incentive structure of exchanges. Perhaps 
the most dramatic example of this is the response of the Scandanivian stock exchanges to 
competition for investors’ orders from the London Stock Market.  In response to this 
competitive challenge, the Scandanivan stock exchanges, beginning with the Stockholm 
Stock Exchange in 1993, demutualized converting themselves into for-profit, 
shareholder-owned organizations.  In the process, it moved wholeheartedly to an 
electronic trading platform and permitted remote access to their trading platforms by 
overseas investment banks.   
  This international competition does not stop at order flow but extends to 
competition for listings. Listing standards, as well as execution services for investors’ 
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orders, are an important part of the “product” being offered to firms by exchanges.  The 
most important example of this phenomenon is the NYSE’s sustained efforts, with 
considerable success, to attract cross-listings from firms around the world.   
Approximately 15% of all NYSE-listed firms are foreign firms.
93 
  A firm’s listing on the U.S. markets, especially for firms from developing 
countries with poor disclosure requirements (as well as poor investor legal protections 
along a variety of other dimensions) does in fact constitute an important mechanism by 
which a firm can commit to a higher level of disclosure.
94  Firms that list on a U.S. 
exchange are subject to many of the basic U.S. disclosure requirements.
95  T h e s e  
mandated disclosures typically include disclosure of the identity of shareholders with 
more than 5% of the shares along with the standard Exchange Act reports. One noticeable 
exception is that foreign cross-listing firms are exempted from the requirement that they 
disclosure information concerning transactions with management when the firm is not 
already disclosing this information to its shareholders.
96   
  The ability of firms to cross-list onto foreign exchanges, and thereby bond 
themselves to more demanding disclosure regimes, does reduce the need for mandatory 
disclosure with respect to firms whose decision makers find a more demanding disclosure 
regime in their self-interest. There is some evidence that cross-listing is a successful 
strategy for these firms and that the source of this success is, in part, due to bonding.
97  
Cross-listings have been found to be beneficial to firms. They are associated with more 
accurate analyst forecasts and increased firm valuation.
98  Improved firm valuation is 
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particularly significant for firms cross-listing from countries with weak disclosure and 
investor protection regimes.
99  
  At the same time, the existing evidence also indicates that cross-listing is still a 
highly imperfect substitute for having a strong disclosure regime in the firm’s home 
country. SEC enforcement actions against cross-listed firms are rare and often 
ineffective. Misconduct occurring in foreign countries is hard to detect and a low 
enforcement priority for the SEC.  The traditional enforcement mechanisms are simply 
not well-suited to cross-border actions.
100   
  Finally, cross-listing is often not a feasible strategy for many firms which are at a 
relatively early stage of development and need external finance.
101  The disclosure regime 
for many firms is therefore largely limited to whatever is being offered by that firm’s 
country or domestic exchange.
102  Moreover, of course, the possibility of cross-listing 
does not address the set of firms that are content with a lax disclosure regime even when 
this creates social costs. 
 
D. Firms Acting in their Individual Capacity 
 
  What if a demanding disclosure regime is not available to a firm from its home 
country, domestic exchange or through cross-listing?  Can a firm credibly commit to a 
demanding disclosure regime through charter provisions or other contractual 
arrangements? Can private contract remedy, in other words, deficiencies in governmental 
and exchange regulation? 
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  The answer is very likely no, at least much of the time.  All the difficulties of 
establishing a mandatory disclosure regime apply a fortiori to firms acting in their 
individual capacity. The ability of any individual firm, through its charter provisions or 
other contractual arrangements, to recreate for itself a credible mandatory disclosure 
regime is highly limited regardless of the benefits. For example, the firm will find it 
difficult to commit to disclosing bad information in the future. While this might be the 
optimal commitment ex ante, firms will sometimes find it in their self-interest ex post not 
to publicly release bad news.
103 Without binding contracts, spelled out in sufficient detail 
in advance and actually enforced through the imposition of real penalties for non-
compliance by courts or private adjudicators, this will be virtually impossible to do.
104 
Moreover, there are obvious economies of scale associated with implementing and 
running a mandatory disclosure regime, such as a settled format for the presentation of 
information, not easily achievable by a firm in isolation.   
  In addition, there is some suggestive empirical evidence that a firm's ability to 
commit to a demanding disclosure regime is affected by whether a country has the 
infrastructure necessary to make such a commitment credible.  Specifically, a recent 
empirical study has found that the number of auditors a country has (scaled by 
population) affects the opacity of firms' disclosures in that country.
105  An increase in the 
number of auditors in a country decreases the earnings opacity of firms' disclosures.
106  
Firms in isolation will likely be unable to create the infrastructure, such as a well-
established auditing profession, necessary to support a credible disclosure regime. 
  Indeed, the consistent finding in the law and finance literature that “law matters” 
for firm valuation, specifically that the lack of certain legal rules and institutions can 
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harm firm valuation, indicates that firms are often unable to employ contracting 
arrangements as an effective substitute for their desired legal regime.
107   
 
E.  Implications for Mandatory Disclosure 
 
  The fact that there will often be no credible means for firms to commit to a 
demanding disclosure regime implies that making available to these firms such a regime, 
whether mandatory or not, would constitute a substantial and much needed improvement 
for many countries.  One could imagine a number of ways such a change could occur 
including making it easier for firms to cross-list onto foreign exchanges.  
  The advantage of mandating a demanding disclosure regime lies in the fact that 
not all firms will want to credibly commit, as was discussed in Part III, to such a regime 
even when it is socially beneficial for them to do so.  Second, and on a more practical 
note, a crucial aspect of any disclosure regime is that firms be credibly bound to disclose 
in the future, perhaps many years later, information that the firm might not, at that point 
in time, wish to.  Even if firms find it in their strong interest to bind themselves ex ante to 
a demanding disclosure regime, say because the firm wishes to raise external finance, 
there will be strong incentives for a firm to later switch to a less demanding disclosure 
regime. Perhaps a less demanding disclosure regime will present the controlling 
shareholder with greater possibilities for diversion of corporate resources or an improved 
ability for managers to hide bad news from the market.   
  The most obvious and straightforward way to accomplish the necessary 
commitment, especially in countries with weak overall legal infrastructures, is to make 
the disclosure requirements mandatory.  There is no evidence, at this point, to indicate 
that firms, especially firms in countries with weak legal infrastructures, can in fact 
credibly bind themselves not to engage in opportunistic mid-stream switching through 
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purely contractual devices, such as supermajority voting rules in the firm charter.
108  In 
sharp contrast, there is growing and substantial evidence, some of which has already been 
discussed, that mandatory disclosure requirements can have a beneficial effect.  Some of 
these empirical studies will be discussed at further length in Part VI. 
  Finally, it should not be overlooked that as a practical matter, for many countries, 
the decision they are facing is whether to have a mandatory disclosure regime or to leave 
matters as they currently stand.  It is therefore important that policy analysis should shed 
some light on this choice. 
 
V.  THE DUPLICATIVE INVESTMENT ARGUMENT FOR MANDATORY DISCLOSURE 
 
  While there are strong arguments that mandatory disclosure can be beneficial, this 
does not mean, of course, that all arguments for mandatory disclosure are convincing. 
The “duplicative investment” argument for mandatory disclosure is one of these.  Given 
its prominence and plausibility, this argument merits careful attention.
109  At bottom, this 
argument ultimately depends on whether firms are willing and able to credibly commit to 
a demanding disclosure regime -- the issues that have already been discussed in Parts III 
and IV. 
  The “duplicative investment” argument for mandatory disclosure requirements is 
based on the highly plausible assumption that firms are the cheapest cost producers of at 
least some firm-specific information relevant to firm valuation.  Mandatory disclosure is 
a way of ensuring that it is firms, rather than traders, that produce this information.  In the 
absence of mandatory disclosure, this information might, instead, be generated by traders 
who wish to capitalize on this information in their trading.  If the cost to traders of 
generating this private information is higher than the cost to the firm of disclosing the 
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information, then mandatory disclosure can play, the argument goes, the socially 
beneficial role of ensuring that these unnecessary costs are avoided.
110   
  Paul Mahoney has argued that this reasoning is unconvincing because there is no 
clear evidence that public disclosures, required by mandated disclosure, actually contain 
information that has not already been impounded into the stock price by privately-
informed traders prior to the public disclosure.
111  But there is, in fact, substantial 
evidence that the information contained in mandatory disclosures can have the effect of 
displacing private information not already reflected in the stock price. 
  Consider the empirical literature on the effect a firm’s mandated public 
disclosures has on the bid-ask spread
112 of that firm’s stock.  If the public information 
contained in the firm’s mandatory disclosure acts as a substitute for private information 
then the effect of increased public disclosure by a firm should be to reduce informational 
asymmetry – the disparity between uninformed and informed investors.  And this should, 
in turn, result in a reduction of the bid-ask spread given the well-established fact that a 
reduction in informational asymmetry in a stock will reduce the bid-ask spread of that 
stock, all else being equal.
113   
  And, indeed, this is what studies have found. The SEC requirement, first imposed 
in 1970, that firms report their performance broken down by business segment, when the 
firm is in more than one line of business, has been found to reduce bid-ask spreads.
114  
On a similar note, the mandated disclosure of the value of oil and gas reserves was also 
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found to reduce bid-ask spreads.
115  Firm disclosures of management’s forecasts of what 
the future might hold for the company also reduce bid-ask spreads.
116        
  The actual reason that the duplicative investment argument is not a reason 
standing  alone to favor mandatory disclosure is that there are good reasons, both 
theoretical and empirical, to believe that higher levels of informed trading do in fact 
result in higher expected returns. And the higher the expected return on a firm’s security, 
the higher the cost of external finance to that firm will be.  If those in charge of the firm 
wish to minimize the cost of external finance, they will take this fact into account in 
deciding whether to commit to a demanding disclosure regime.
117 An exchange, for 
instance, with a lax disclosure regime might for this reason be unattractive to a firm if one 
were willing to assume that those in charge of the firm care to minimize the cost of 
external finance.  If one is not willing to make such an assumption, then it is this refusal 
that forms the real basis of the case for mandatory disclosure.   
  Why might higher levels of informed trading result in higher expected stock 
returns? Fortunately, several important papers have recently addressed this question.
118 
Consider an uninformed investor who buys an optimally diversified portfolio. Despite 
diversifying, this investor will still nevertheless do worse on average than investors with 
private information who are better able to select stocks in constructing their portfolio. 
Whether the uninformed investor transacts frequently or not, the investor will likely end 
up holding poorly performing stocks relative to the portfolio held by informed 
investors.
119 A reduction in the amount of private information held by other traders will 
reduce this difference in the portfolios held by informed and uninformed traders, and, as a 
result, the risk to uninformed investors that they will end up holding comparatively 
poorly performing stocks in their portfolio.   
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  This reasoning implies that the inferior ability of uninformed investors to pick 
stocks cannot be diversified away. Consider an uninformed investor who decides to 
purchase a diversified portfolio and to hold it indefinitely.  If there is private information 
at the time the investor constructs the portfolio then it will still be the case that they will 
be more likely to hold stocks that are comparatively poor performers. Moreover, the 
decision to hold the same portfolio indefinitely will incur a real cost if the investor needs 
to rebalance his portfolio in response to chances over time in wealth, liquidity needs and 
risk preferences.  Uninformed rational investors, knowing of this cost ex ante, will 
require a higher rate of return to compensate them for the costs created by this 
inflexibility. 
  One might object that this reasoning relies on the assumption that there are two 
categories of investors: those who hold private information and those who do not.  What 
if the analysis is moved back a step?  Suppose it is unclear ex ante whether any particular 
investor will acquire private information at s o m e  p o i n t  i n  t h e  f u t u r e ?   W h a t  i f  a l l  
investors know is that in the future there will be asymmetrical information, but not 
whether they themselves will be the holders of private information? 
  If this is true then it might appear as if informational asymmetry does not create, 
on net, costs for investors.  If an investor ends up being a holder of private information 
then he will earn more, given his increased ability to buy attractive stocks and sell 
unattractive stocks, then those who do not have this information.  On the other hand, if an 
investor ends up being an uninformed investor then he will earn less than his informed 
counterparts by exactly the amount that the informed investors benefit from their private 
information. Viewed in this way, these two effects of informational asymmetry are ex 
ante a wash and, as a result, investors will not demand a higher rate of return on stocks 
that have higher levels of informational asymmetry.  
  But this reasoning ignores, as a recent model by Nicolae Garleanu and Lassa 
Pedersen illustrates, the following. In the presence of informational asymmetry, investors 
will anticipate that the portfolios they will hold in the future will differ from what would   45
otherwise be the case in a situation where there was no informational asymmetry.
120  
Given the presence of private information, there will be times when an informed investor 
will refuse to sell a stock despite having a liquidity reason to do so.  This will occur if the 
investor has sufficiently good private news about the stock. At the same time, there will 
be times when an informed investor will sell a stock if he has sufficiently bad private 
news about the stock, despite having no other reason to alter his portfolio.
121   
  In other words, the introduction of informed traders changes the portfolio 
decisions that would otherwise be made in order to take advantage of private information.  
This represents a cost, albeit a cost informed investors are willing to bear to take 
advantage of their information. Given that the direct effect on investors of future private 
information is zero, as the bid-ask spread does not represent a net cost, but that there is a 
change in the portfolio decisions of investors from what would otherwise be the case, it 
follows that adverse selection increases costs through its effect on portfolio decisions. 
  There is empirical evidence that informational asymmetry does, in fact, appear to 
have an important effect on stock returns.
122  David Easley, Soeren Hvidkjaer and 
Maureen O’Hara employ an empirical measure, developed in a series of earlier papers,
123 
that measures how much private information-based trading is occurring in a stock (the so-
called PIN measure) to investigate the effect of private information on expected stock 
returns.
124  
  Looking at NYSE-listed stocks for the 1983-1998 period they found that stocks 
with higher probabilities of private information-based trading, controlling for a number of 
factors, had higher rates of return than otherwise comparable stocks with lower levels of 
private information-based trading.
125  Importantly, the probability of private information-
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based trading still affected stock returns even after bid-ask spreads were controlled for. 
Indeed, bid-ask spreads did not have any explanatory power in explaining stock returns in 
their study. 
  While important research, the Easley, Hvidkjaer and O’Hara study does have 
some shortcomings that should be kept in mind.  First, market beta and the coefficients 
on book-to-market and firm size had no statistically significance in explaining the cost of 
capital in their study.  This is inconsistent with prior empirical research that has found 
these factors to have explanatory power in explaining stock returns.  Moreover, it is 
conceptually puzzling that commonly identified sources of systematic risk, in particular 
stock market co-movement, have no measurable effect on stock returns. 
  Second, the study did not control for the level of public information concerning 
firm value.  While more private information was associated with a higher expected 
return, they did not control for whether this association still held when controlling for the 
amount of public information available.  This failure to control for the level of public 
information is problematic given the fact that private and public information, whether 
they are substitutes or complements, could very well be correlated.  This would call into 
question the results of their regressions. 
 
VI.  THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
 
  While there are strong reasons to believe that mandatory disclosure requirements 
can be socially beneficial, this obviously does not mean that the actual implementation 
and administration of any particular mandatory disclosure regime will prove to be so.  It 
is not hard to imagine the various ways in which government regulation of disclosure 
could go awry.  Regulators will inevitably have imperfect information concerning which 
pieces of information the disclosure of which will improve the performance of the capital 
markets. Moreover, regulators will have imperfect incentives to seek out the needed 
information.   
  An example of a regulatory regime gone astray would be a mandatory disclosure 
regime that focuses on requiring irrelevant information to be released.  Indeed, some   47
commentators have argued that this is in fact what the Securities and Exchange 
Commission has done in its regulations implementing the Securities Act of 1933 and the 
Exchange Act of 1934.
126 Even if disclosure requirements mandate the release of 
potentially relevant information, firms might subvert the regulatory regime by meeting 
the technical requirements of the disclosure regime while actually avoiding disclosing 
specific pieces of information they would rather keep hidden.
127 
  At the end of the day, it is fair to say that whether any particular mandatory 
disclosure regime, as actually instituted and administered, is socially beneficial is an 
empirical question. Whatever the benefits, there might be more than offsetting costs.  It is 
on the empirical evidence that directly attempts to measure the effects of mandated 
disclosure, some of which has already been discussed, that the discussion will now focus. 
 
A.  What to Test for? 
 
  A major weakness in the empirical literature on the effects of mandatory 
disclosure has been a lack of a firm theoretical basis for the testing that has been 
conducted. Fortunately, recent theoretical research has begun to provide the necessary 
theory to provide a solid basis for focusing on stock returns, volatility and the size of a 
country’s equity market.  Understanding this theory is crucial as it provides the necessary 
framework with which to interpret the findings of the empirical literature on mandatory 
disclosure. 
 
  1.  Stock Returns  
 
  Empirical research on mandatory disclosure has typically measured the effects of 
changes in mandatory disclosure on the stock returns of firms affected by these changes.   
Measuring these effects does have a solid theoretical basis.  If an unexpected 
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improvement in mandatory disclosure requirements reduces agency costs, such as 
reducing the diversion of corporate resources, this should result in positive abnormal 
returns for the set of companies affected by the change.
128  The lower level of future 
expected agency costs will be capitalized into the current stock price to the benefit of 
current shareholders.   
  Whether stock returns of firms subject to more demanding disclosure 
requirements are affected, compared to unaffected firms, once the benefits of lower 
agency costs have been capitalized into the stock price depends on whether the costs 
borne by shareholders on an ongoing basis to minimize agency costs are reduced by the 
change in mandatory disclosure.  If more demanding disclosure requirements reduce 
these costs, say monitoring and auditing costs, then risk-adjusted stock returns should be 
lower.
129  This is because with lower expected costs, shareholders can be induced to hold 
equity with a lower expected stock return.  Net of costs, shareholders will be doing just as 
well as before. On the other hand, if the costs borne by shareholders are unaffected by a 
more demanding disclosure regime, stock returns of affected firms should not be affected 
once the future benefits of reduced agency costs are capitalized into the stock price.   
 
  2.  Volatility 
  
  Several empirical studies of mandatory disclosure have measured the volatility of 
stock returns pre- and post-mandatory disclosure.  Assuming that the effect of mandatory 
disclosure, if it is working, is to cause the release of information by firms earlier in time 
than it otherwise would have been, then the variance-bound finance literature indicates 
that this should result in lower stock return volatility.
130  Earlier release of information 
ensures that the information has less of an impact on a firm’s stock price assuming a 
positive discount rate.  In other words, information concerning a more distant future 
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event is more heavily discounted than information concerning an event in the immediate 
future.  As a result, information released earlier in time will have less of an impact on a 
firm’s stock price. 
  Unfortunately, there is also an empirical literature that suggests that high levels of 
volatility can be a sign of more informed stock prices.  In cross-country studies, markets 
with high levels of stock price synchronicity (stocks tending to move together) tend to be 
in less-developed markets.
131  Moreover, firms with high levels of firm-specific volatility 
have stock prices that better predict the future earnings of the company.
132  To date, 
however, there has been no formal model explaining why high levels of firm-specific 
volatility should be an indication of more informed stock prices.
133 
  
  3.  Size of the Equity Market 
 
  A number of studies have examined the effect of legal rules, such as mandatory 
disclosure requirements, on financial development.  One standard proxy for financial 
development is the size of a country’s stock market capitalization held by non-controlling 
shareholders scaled by a country’s GDP. Another popular proxy is the number of listed 
firms per capita.  Increases in financial development can, in theory, be caused by legal 
rules, such as mandatory disclosure requirements, that reduce private benefits of control 
and thereby enable more extensive use of external finance by firms.   
  On a cautionary note, however, establishing such a causal link through 
correlations between financial development and legal rules is difficult given the need to 
convincingly control for country-specific factors besides differences in legal regimes 
across countries.  Moreover, reverse causation is also a plausible possibility.  In the 
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reverse causation story, financial development creates a shareholder constituency that 
demands, and ultimately receives, improved legal protections.
134 
  
B.  Candidates for Testing: Mandatory Disclosure Regimes 
 
  Obvious candidates for measuring the effects, if any, of mandatory disclosure are 
any fundamental changes in the scope of mandatory disclosure in the United States.   
There have been two such changes.  The Securities Act of 1933 and the Exchange Act of 
1934 represent the first of these fundamental changes. These two statutes placed 
extensive mandatory disclosure requirements on exchange-listed firms (Exchange Act of 
1934) and firms issuing securities to the public (Securities Act of 1933).  The Securities 
Act Amendments of 1964 represents the second fundamental change in mandatory 
disclosure requirements in the United States.
135  The Securities Act Amendments of 1964 
extended the mandatory disclosure requirements of the Exchange Act of 1934 to most 
non-listed firms (the over-the-counter market).   
  In addition to these two fundamental changes, there have been several important 
changes to mandatory disclosure in the U.S that are promising candidates for measuring 
the effects of mandatory disclosure requirements.  These changes include the requirement 
imposed by the SEC in December of 1980 that managers, in the Managerial Discussion 
and Analysis section of the annual report, discuss managers’ analysis of the future 
prospects of the company.   A second important change occurred in 1999 when the SEC 
mandated that the Exchange Act of 1934's disclosure requirements be extended to firms 
trading on the OTC Bulletin Board.  These firms constitute most of the remaining over-
the-counter firms not already subject to mandatory disclosure requirements as a result of 
the Securities Act Amendments of 1964. 
  While the United States has a substantially higher incidence of dispersed 
ownership structures than other countries, the effect of mandatory disclosure in the U.S. 
is still quite useful in assessing the possible effects of mandatory disclosure in other 
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countries for several reasons.  First, a nontrivial portion of companies in the United States 
have concentrated ownership structures.
136 The mean ownership of the three largest 
shareholders in the United States is approximately 20%.
137 Moreover, the levels of 
concentrated ownership in the U.S. earlier in time in some markets, such as the over-the-
counter market circa 1962, was substantial.
138 Second, mandatory disclosure arguably 
serves a similar function in the U.S. as in countries with concentrated ownership in terms 
of controlling agency costs even though there are differences in the nature of the agency 
problem.  The typical agency problem in the U.S. takes the form of managers not acting 
in the interests of shareholders.
139  Finally, many of the studies of mandatory disclosure 
have focused on the U.S. given the availability of data.  Ignoring these studies would be 
to ignore much of the available evidence on the effects of mandatory disclosure.  
  A third source for examining the effects of mandatory disclosure are cross-
country studies that measure the effect of mandatory disclosure requirements on financial 
development and firms’ cost of capital.  There is substantial variation across countries 
both in terms of their disclosure requirements and in their actual enforcement of these 
requirements.  These differences are often substantially larger than variation in the levels 
of mandated disclosure across U.S. firms. 
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C.  Empirical Studies of Mandatory Disclosure Regulation 
 
  1.  Studies of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Exchange Act of 1934 
 
  George Stigler conducted the first empirical study of the effects of mandatory 
disclosure.
140  His groundbreaking study focused on the Securities Act of 1933 which 
regulates the disclosure requirements of new issues of securities.  He compared the 
performance of new issues of securities pre-mandatory disclosure (1920s) to post-
mandatory disclosure (1950s).  The study concluded that there was no meaningful change 
in the stock return performance of new issues of securities pre- and post-mandated 
disclosure.  However, the study did find that the variance of returns of new issues was 
substantially lower in the post-mandated disclosure period.
141 A subsequent study 
confirmed Stigler’s results that new issues did not perform better in the post-mandated 
disclosure period and that variance of new issues was lower post-mandated disclosure.
142  
Based on these results, Stigler concluded that the Securities Act of 1933 was 
unnecessary. 
  However, there are serious questions as to whether Stigler’s results are very 
informative of the desirability of the Securities Act of 1933.  First, Stigler’s post-
mandatory disclosure time period is several decades after the change in disclosure.  It is 
unclear why one would expect, at this late period, stock return performance of new issues 
to be affected by mandatory disclosure requirements even assuming mandatory disclosure 
is socially desirable.  The effects of mandatory disclosure, if any, were presumably 
capitalized into stock prices years earlier. Second, Stigler used no control group, beyond 
the market index, thereby making it almost impossible for him to control for changing 
market conditions over this long period of time. 
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  Carol Simon has also examined the Securities Act of 1933.
143  Her study found 
that the cross-sectional variance of monthly abnormal returns of new issues in the pre-
mandated disclosure period (1926-1933) was larger than the cross-sectional variance of 
monthly abnormal returns of new issues in the post-mandated disclosure period (1934-
1939) for non-NYSE unseasoned companies.
144  Using the cross-sectional variance as a 
proxy for investor uncertainty about a firm’s future prospects, she concludes that the 
Securities Act of 1933 reduced investor uncertainty for this group of firms.   
  As with Stigler’s study, it is difficult to draw any firm conclusions from these 
results.  Perhaps the most serious problem with the study is the failure to provide a strong 
theoretical basis for using the cross-sectional variance as a proxy for investor uncertainty.  
Moreover, as with the Stigler study, there is no control group that was used to control for 
changing market conditions over the time period studied. 
  In perhaps the most influential of all the mandated disclosure studies, George 
Benston examined the relative effect of the Exchange Act of 1934 on two sets of firms.
145  
This study compared the effects that the imposition of mandated disclosure had on a set 
of firms that were not voluntarily disclosing sales information prior to the Exchange Act 
of 1934 relative to a set of firms that were already voluntarily disclosing sales 
information. The set of voluntarily disclosing firms, in other words, served as Benston’s 
control group.  Benston found that there was no difference in stock return performance 
between the two groups around the period of the enactment of the Exchange Act of 1934.  
Moreover, while the variance of stock prices for both groups declined, there was no 
relative change in the variance of the two groups.
146  Based on these results, Benston – 
along with a number of legal academics – concluded that the Exchange Act of 1934 was 
not socially beneficial.
147 
  The strength of Benston’s conclusions rest on how convincingly the study is able 
to control for changing market conditions through using the set of voluntarily disclosing 
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firms as a control group.  There are, however, serious problems with Benston’s control 
group.  First, further examination of this group of voluntarily disclosing firms reveals that 
many of these firms were not disclosing a number of pieces of information later required 
to be disclosed under the Exchange Act of 1934.
148  Second, the Exchange Act of 1934 
introduced new liability standards that changed the legal consequences of making 
misleading disclosures.  This important change introduced by the Exchange Act of 1934 
would affect both disclosing and non-disclosing firms.
149 
 
  2.  Studies of the 1964 Securities Act Amendments 
 
  A recent study by the author has looked at the effects of the 1964 Securities Act 
Amendments’ imposition of mandatory disclosure on the over-the-counter market.
150  
Unlike some of the earlier studies, there exists a natural control group to control for 
changing market conditions for the time period studied (1962-1968), i.e. the listed 
companies that had been subject to mandatory disclosure requirements since 1934.  The 
study used a unique database that consisted of stock price information three years prior to 
the effective date of the 1964 Securities Act Amendments (1962-65) and three years after 
these mandatory disclosure requirements were imposed (1965-68). 
  The study found that there was a substantial reduction in the volatility of over-the-
counter stocks in the aftermath of the Securities Act Amendments.  In the post-mandatory 
disclosure period (1965-68), there was no statistically significant difference in the 
volatility of the over-the-counter stocks and that of the listed stocks.  In the pre-
mandatory disclosure period, in contrast, over-the-counter stocks experienced 
significantly higher levels of volatility compared to the listed market.  This can be seen in 
the following graph of the yearly average variances of stocks in the over-the-counter 
market and the listed market.  The black line marks the passage of the Securities Act 
Amendments. 
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  In terms of abnormal stock returns, the study found that over-the-counter stocks 
experienced a positive abnormal return of approximately 6% in 1963.  The year 1963 was 
chosen as this was the year the market first learned that the Securities Act Amendments 
were being considered and were likely to be enacted.  Consistent with this finding, a 
contemporaneous study has found a positive abnormal return in the over-the-counter 
market in 1963 in the range of 8%.
151 
 
  3.  Studies of Other Mandated Disclosure Changes in the U.S. 
 
  A recent study has found that the requirement, first imposed in December of 
1980, that managers discuss their firms’ likely future prospects improved firms’ share 
price accuracy.
152  They based this conclusion on two findings.  First, they found that in 
the immediate aftermath of this requirement, the number of firms with below average 
returns temporarily increased.
153  This suggested that poorly-performing firms were 
forced to disclose information that they would have otherwise attempted to keep hidden 
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as a result of this requirement.  In addition, they found that the group of firms with 
average stock return performance had lower levels of stock price synchronicity.  Using 
stock price synchronicity as a proxy for share price accuracy, this suggests that average 
performing companies had more informed stock prices. 
  A second study has examined the effect of the imposition in 1999 of mandatory 
disclosure requirements on OTC Bulletin Board companies.
154  These firms are typically 
much smaller than NASDAQ or NYSE-listed firms.  OTC Bulletin Board firms that did 
not wish to comply with the new mandatory disclosure requirements could elect to be 
removed from the OTC Bulletin Board.  The study found that firms that were already 
complying with the mandatory disclosure requirements experienced significant positive 
abnormal stock returns.  However, firms that elected to move (approximately 76% of all 
firms not already in compliance) and firms that were not already in compliance but 
choose not to move experienced significantly lower returns than those of the firms 
already in compliance. These findings suggest that for small, illiquid firms the benefits of 
mandatory disclosure can often be outweighed by the costs that it imposes for a 
significant number of these firms. 
 
4.  Cross-Country Evidence 
 
  Several studies have found that more demanding mandatory disclosure regimes 
are correlated with higher levels of financial development.
155  This is consistent with the 
hypothesis that mandatory disclosure increases the use of external finance as a result of 
increasing the ability of controlling shareholders to credibly commit to return the firms’ 
profits to investors rather than having them diverted to themselves. 
  Increases in a country’s mandated disclosure requirements, as measured by a 
“disclosure index,” have been found to be associated with an increase in listed firms per 
                                                 
154 See Brian Bushee and Christian Leuz, Economic Consequences of SEC Disclosure Regulation: 
Evidence from the OTC Bulletin Board, forthcoming 39 Journal of Accounting and Economics (2005). 
155 Most of the “law and finance” studies have not focused, however, on mandatory disclosure requirements 
but rather have used indexes, such as the “anti-directors” index, that measure the strength of a country’s 
investor rights along other dimensions.   57
capita (as well as increases in other proxies for financial development).
156  A  t w o -
standard deviation increase in a country's "disclosure index" was associated with an 
impressive 52% rise in the number of listed firms per capita.
157  Interestingly, a country’s 
“disclosure index” score generally had more explanatory power for that country’s level of 
financial development than the “anti-directors” index that focuses on shareholders' 
corporate law rights. 
  Consistent with these findings, another recent study employing the same 
“disclosure index” found that in a dataset consisting of forty countries over the 1992-
2001 period countries with more demanding disclosure requirements had significantly 
lower costs of external finance.
158  This effect on cost of capital was strongest in 
countries with segmented capital markets, i.e. countries in which there were impediments 
to foreign capital flowing into the country.  Mandatory disclosure requirements, however, 
did continue to reduce firms’ cost of external finance even in countries relatively open to 
international capital flows. 
 
D.  Evidence from the State Competition Literature 
 
  Some commentators have stressed that the beneficial effects of allowing firms to 
select their state of incorporation, and thereby their governing corporate law, provides 
powerful evidence that mandatory disclosure requirements should be removed.
159  I f  
regulatory competition between the states works well in the corporate law area, it should 
work as well in the securities field.  More specifically, proponents of state competition 
have relied heavily on the argument that the empirical evidence indicates that the 
                                                 
156 See Rafael La Porta, Florencio-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer, What Works in Securities Laws?, 
Working Paper 2004.  The “disclosure index” is the average of six disclosure proxies: requirements that a 
prospectus be delivered to potential investors; disclosure of insiders’ compensation; disclosure of 
ownership by large shareholders; disclosure of inside ownership; disclosure of contracts outside the normal 
course of business; and disclosure of transactions with related parties. 
157 Id. at 16. 
158 See Luzi Hail and Christain Leuz, International Differences in Cost of Equity Capital: Do Legal 
Institutions and Securities Regulation Matter?, Working Paper 2004. 
159 See, e.g., Romano, Empowering Investors, 107 Yale L.J. at 2383 (“The most important data bearing on 
the question whether the federal securities regime should be eliminated is . . . the research on the impact on 
shareholder welfare of state competition for charters.”).   58
corporate law of Delaware, the winner of this competition for incorporations, improves 
firm valuation.   
  Even granting the premise that the evidence on the merits of state competition in 
the provision of corporate law is central to evaluating the desirability of mandatory 
disclosure, this argument is unconvincing. The evidence that Delaware improves firm 
value is actually weak. While there is one study documenting that Delaware 
incorporation increases firm valuation,
160 subsequent empirical studies have failed to find 
that Delaware law consistently improves firm valuation.  Two of these subsequent studies 
found that Delaware incorporation increased firm value in the early 1990s, but in the later 
half of the 1990s the Delaware firm valuation effect was either nonexistent or negative.
161 
Another study found no effect of Delaware incorporation on firm value in the 1990s.
162 
 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
  
  The theoretical case for mandatory disclosure for countries with concentrated 
ownership structures is strong.  The case for mandatory disclosure is strong, in other 
words, for virtually all countries around the world.  Controlling shareholders will prefer a 
lax disclosure regime to serve the twin goals of protecting their private benefits of control 
and, equally important, to suppress competition in both the market for capital and in the 
product market.  
  As for the first goal -- protecting private benefits of control -- the evidence clearly 
demonstrates that controlling shareholders' private benefits of control are substantial for 
many countries around the world.  Moreover, theory and evidence indicate that 
mandatory disclosure can have the effect of reducing these private benefits of control 
substantially. Accordingly, existing controlling shareholders will tend to have a 
preference for a lax disclosure regime. 
                                                 
160 Daines, Robert, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value?, 62 Journal of Financial Economics 559 
(2001). 
161 Gompers, Paul, Ishii, Joy and Andrew Metrick, Corporate Governance and Equity Returns, 118 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 107 (2003); Guhan Subramanian, The Disappearing Delaware Effect, 20 
Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 32-59 (2004). 
162 Lucian Bebchuk and Alma Cohen, The Costs of Entrenched Boards, Working Paper 2003.   59
  As for the second goal -- suppressing competition -- there are again strong 
theoretical reasons, backed by an impressive body of empirical evidence, that mandatory 
disclosure can have the socially desirable effect of increasing competition between firms 
for capital and competition in the product market.  Competition for capital will increase 
because some firms will find their access to external finance enhanced as a result of being 
able to credibly commit to a demanding disclosure regime.  Firms that were able to raise 
capital under a lax disclosure regime will have to compete with more firms for capital in 
the presence of a mandatory disclosure regime. Competition in the product market will 
increase as potential competitors have an enhanced ability to raise external finance to 
fund their operations. 
  The empirical evidence on the effects of mandatory disclosure on stock returns, 
volatility and financial development are consistent with mandatory disclosure often 
having socially beneficial effects.  In particular, several recent important empirical 
studies have provided new evidence pointing to mandated disclosure playing a socially 
beneficial role. 
  Whether countries around the world should adopt or strengthen their mandatory 
disclosure requirements is a pressing policy question.  The legal academic debate has 
largely ignored, however, the merits of mandatory disclosure regulation for most 
countries around the world, i.e. countries with concentrated ownership structures.  This 
Article has argued that mandatory disclosure requirements in securities regulation can 
play an important and socially beneficial role for these countries. 
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EASTMAN KODAK COMPANY, 
 
OF NEW JERSEY. 
 
PRINCIPAL OFFICE, 83 MONTGOMERY ST., JERSEY CITY,  N.J  
EXECUTIVE OFFICES, ROCHESTER, N.Y. 
 
 
     REPORT OF THE DIRECTORS 
 
    To be presented at the third annual meeting of the shareholders, to be  
held at 83 Montgomery St., Jersey City, N. J., on Tuesday, April 5th, 1904, at 
twelve o’clock noon. 
The Directors submit herewith the audited statement of account for the 
year ending the 31st of December, 1903, being the first full year of business of 
the company. 
In the balance sheet presented the earnings of all the subsidiary 
companies are included for the period mentioned. 
The balance sheet shows carried to surplus for the twelve months the 
amount of $612,023.64 after paying quarterly dividends for the year at the rate 
of 6% per annum on its preferred stock and warrants and 10% on its common 
stock and warrants, and after charging off liberal amounts for depreciation on 
the various plants and $78,404.18 for special reserves. 
Attention is again called to the  fact that the Company is paying 
dividends upon a large amount of capital which has been in but which has not 
been invested.  The amount uninvested at the close of the period was about 
$3,000,000. 
The progress of the company during the past year was fully covered  
by the directors’ preliminary report which was sent to the shareholders early in  
January. 
The Directors retiring in conformity with the By-Laws are Messrs. 
George Eastman, Sir James Penders and Lord Kelvin. These gentlemen, being 
eligible, offer themselves for re-election.  A director is also to be elected to fill 
the vacancy caused by the death of Mr. Edwin. 
The Auditors, Messrs. Price, Waterhouse & Company, also retire and 
offer themselves for re-election. 
By order of the Board. 
W. S. 
HUBBELL, 
Secretary   62
EASTMAN KODAK COMPANY OF NEW JERSEY  
  COMBINED BALANCE SHEET, 311 
  
LIABILITIES 
 
CAPITAL STOCK: 
Preferred  Stock  authorized…     $10,000,000 
of which there has been issued,     $6,170,368.01 
Common Stock authorized, ...        25,000,000 
of which there has-been issued,      19,356,000.67 
          $25,526,368.68 
 
LESS: Calls unpaid ……………………….    705,292.50     $24,821,076.18         
 
CAPITAL STOCK OF SUBSIDIARY COMPANIES 
OUTSTANDING ……………………………           42,000.00 
CURRENT LIABILITIES: 
  Accounts Payable, ………………………….    554,031.28 
  Preferred Stock, Dividends payable January 
   1
st, 1904 ……………………………………      90,080.07 
  Common Stock, Dividends payable January 
       1
st, 1904 ……………………………………    470,872.56  
 $1,114,983.91  
 
SURPLUS: 
  Balance of 31
st December, 1902 per Balance 
    Sheet ………………………………….    $468,999.29       
  Profits of Combined Companies for the year 
   Ending  31
st December 1903.   2,925,691.16 
 $3,394,690.45 
 
DEDUCT: 
  Dividends and Interest, 
    6% on Preferred Stock………………  $368,058.57 
    10% on Common Stock ……………  1,866,804.77 
   $2,234,863.34 
  On Outstanding Stock of Sub- 
    sidiary Companies ……………                  400.00 
 $2,235,863.34 
 
  Special Reserves ………………….     ____78,404.18  
         $2,313,667.52
 $1,081,022.93 
      
 $27,081,022.93   63
 
  
AND ITS SUBSIDIARY COMPANIES. 
31ST DECEMBER, 1903. 
 
          A S S E T S :  
 
COST OF PROPERTY, including Real Estate, Build- 
ings,  Plant,  Machinery,  Patents  and  Good  Will,          
              
            
  $17,513,685.54 
 
CURRENT ASSETS: 
Merchandise, Materials and Supplies, ……………………  2,512,325.17 
Accounts and Bills Receivable, ………………………..  1,043,996.45 
Railway Bonds and other Investments, …………….…...  1,753,594.58 
Call Loans, ……………………………………………..     650,000.00 
Cash at Banks and on Hand, ……………………………  3,200,269.58 
Miscellaneous, ………………………………………..     285,211.70 
 
                     $  9,545,397.48 
             $27,059,083.02 
 
 
 
        We have examined  the books of the Eastman Kodak company of New Jersey, and of 
Kodak Limited  for the year ending December 31
, 1903 and we have been furnished with 
certified  returns from the American and European Branches, The Kodak Gesellschaft and the 
Societe Anonymè Francaise for the same  period  and we certify that the Balance Sheet at that 
date is correctly prepared therefrom. 
We have satisfied ourselves that during the year only actual additions and extensions have 
been charged to cost of property and that ample provision has been made for Depreciation. 
We are satisfied that the valuations of the Inventories of stocks on hand, as certified by the 
responsible officials, have been carefully and accurately, full provision has been made for Bad and 
Doubtful Accounts Receivable and for all ascertainable Liabilities. 
We have verified the cash and securities by actual inspection and by certificates from the 
depositories, and are of opinion that the stocks and bonds are fully worth  the value at which they 
are stated in the Balance Sheet. 
And we certify that in our opinion the Balance Sheet is properly drawn up so as to show the 
true financial position of the Company and its Subsidiary Companies, and the Profits thereof  for the 
year ending at that date. 
 
(Signed) PRICE,, WATERHOUSE & Co. 
 Chartered  Accountants 
54 William Street, 
 New  York  City 
28
th March, 1904 
 
 